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1 Introduction                    
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions at home or abroad has become the dilemma within 
contemporary climate change policy, touching upon various concepts such as cost-
effectiveness, environmental effectiveness, equity, and sustainable development, and 
challenging the North-South relationship in itself. Although Annex I Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol are legally obligated, through the supplementarity requirement, to meet their 
Kyoto emission reduction targets to a certain extent through domestic actions, most 
Parties prefer to make use of flexibility mechanisms arguing that actions to reduce 
emissions should be taken where it is cheapest given the fact that the effect on the 
atmosphere will be the same.   
 
This research paper explores the limits to flexibility and elucidates the understanding of the 
supplementarity requirement in the Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. While the 
flexibility mechanisms allow Annex I Parties to earn and trade emission allowances 
through projects implemented either in other developed countries or in developing 
countries and which they can use towards meeting their commitments, the supplementarity 
requirement in the articles was adopted to safeguard concerns as to the integrity of the 
international climate regime. There was especially a concern that the flexibility 
mechanisms could confer a right to emit on Annex I Parties. The negotiators of the Kyoto 
Protocol attempted to design the provisions on the mechanisms in such a manner as to both 
fulfil the cost-effectiveness promise of the mechanisms and to address concerns about 
environmental integrity and equity. 
 
Even though the objective the supplementarity requirement is clear, the practical 
implications of the requirement have been subject to a long debate particularly due to the 
lack of a quantified definition of the requirement. As the Kyoto Protocol only mentions that 
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use of the flexibility mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purposes of meeting the Kyoto reduction commitments, Kyoto Parties have disagreed on 
the amount of actions to be taken at home. This research paper attempts to provide an 
effective and justifiable interpretation of the supplementarity requirement which would be 
acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries taking into account cost-, and 
environmental effectiveness as well as equity considerations. 
 
The approach used to elucidate the understanding of the supplementarity requirement is 
based on the law of treaty interpretation. The second chapter analyzes the interpretation of 
the requirement in accordance with the Articles 31(1), (2), and (3.a) Vienna Convention. 
This analysis aims to put forward a workable understanding of the supplementarity 
requirement through a literal, teleological and systematic interpretation. The chapter 
discusses not only the relevant provisions in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, but also subsequent agreements, such as the Bonn 
Agreements and the Marrakech Accords, and the negotiating history of the supplementarity 
requirement in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Article 31 (3.b) Vienna Convention states that to determine the interpretation of a 
provision, there shall also be taken into account any subsequent practice in the application 
of the treaty. The third chapter presents therefore the implementation of the 
supplementarity requirement by the Kyoto Protocols parties and examines whether state 
practice establishes an agreement of the Parties regarding the interpretation1. This 
empirical analysis considers both the National Communications of those Parties that rely 
most on the flexibility mechanisms and the In-Depth Review Reports to these National 
Communications by the UNFCCC Compliance Committee.  
 
National reports are however not always up-to-date and do not always adequately present a 
Partys climate change policy and its use of flexibility mechanisms to attain the emission 
reduction target in the Kyoto protocol. Therefore, the third chapter also requires the 
                                                
1 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.3.b. 
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presentation of several in-depth national climate change policies. Finally, it will be 
considered whether the implementation of the supplementarity requirement and state 
practice could contribute to determining to interpretation of the requirement.     
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis relies on the principle of effective interpretation. In 
accordance with this principle, a treaty must be given an interpretation that enables its 
provisions to be effective and useful, that is, to have the appropriate effect2. If the general 
rule of interpretation, subsequent agreements, or the empirical analysis of state practice do 
not put forward a workable understanding of the supplementarity requirement, an 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement could be presented in accordance with the 
principle of effectiveness.  
 
The final chapter thus assesses the supplementarity requirement against the background of 
dangerously increasing greenhouse gas emissions, the need of global participation in the 
fight against climate change, the idea of environmental effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness, and the importance of domestic actions for moral and political reasons. This 
chapter provides a guideline for the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement 
which contributes to the main objective to attain stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system3, while also taking into account the above concerns. 
 
Background to the thesis 
Climate change is widely acknowledged to be the most important environmental problem 
facing humankind. The scientific assessment of the causes and impacts of climate change 
has been undertaken by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Established in 1988, the IPCC has produced four major assessment reports that have helped 
policy-makers understand that the Earths climate system is the result of complex and 
dynamic interactions between the earths atmosphere, biosphere and oceans which human 
                                                
2 Cassesse 2005, p.178. 
3  UNFCCC Article 2. 
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activities are beginning to throw out of balance. The most recent IPCC report, the 2007 
Fourth Assessment Report, concluded that change of the climate is unequivocal and that 
most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the midt-20th century 
is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations4.  
 
Because the atmosphere knows no boundaries and the worlds economies are linked 
through trade and capital flows, international cooperation to reduce greenhouse gases is 
essential. The institutional framework for such cooperation is provided by the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and by its additional 1997 
Kyoto Protocol. Article 2 of the Framework Convention establishes the ultimate objective 
for the Parties; stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. To attain 
this objective, legally binding greenhouse gas reduction targets for developed countries 
have been specified in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Annex I parties agreed to reduce, by an 
average, their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels for the period 
2008 to 2012.  
 
This 5.2 per cent reduction is estimated to represent an actual reduction of about 30 per 
cent over business as usual emissions levels.5 Economic research has foreseen that it will 
be very costly for some developed countries to comply with the target individually and 
therefore the Kyoto Protocol provides for international co-operation to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions through flexible mechanisms. Thus countries with Kyoto targets could either 
achieve their targets through domestic efforts, or they could reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in other countries at lower costs that at home by making use of the three flexible 
mechanisms set out in the Protocol: joint implementation (JI), the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and international emissions trading (IET). 
 
                                                
4  IPCC WGI Fourth Assessment report of February 2007. 
5  Sands 2003  
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Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol states that the Parties included in Annex I may participate 
in emissions trading with other Annex I Parties for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3. The basic mechanics of international emissions trading are 
relatively simple. First, governments must commit to emission limitation targets. Second, 
such targets are divided into discrete, tradable units. These tradable units are often referred 
to as allowances, because they allow the holder to emit a specified amount of greenhouse 
gases, say one ton of carbon dioxide or the equivalent amount of another greenhouse gas. 
Governments may choose whether to distribute these allowances to domestic emitting 
sources. Third, allowances could then change hands in several ways- in trades between 
governments, between a governmental and private entity, and between private entities. The 
party purchasing allowances is entitled to emit more; the party selling those allowances is 
required to emit less.  
 
As to joint implementation, Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol states that any Annex I party, 
with a commitment inscribed in Annex B, may for the purpose of meeting its commitments 
under Article 3, transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units 
resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing 
anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, 
provided that certain requirements are met. The investing countries are the Annex I 
countries that will face high abatement costs for meeting their commitments, while the host 
countries are the Annex I countries with low cost function for meeting their commitments.  
 
Finally, in Article 12, the Kyoto Protocol specifies that the Clean Development Mechanism 
allows for transfers of certified emission reductions resulting from emission reduction or 
removal projects between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. These certified emission 
reductions generated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties to help meet 
their emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, and the project should 
assist non-Kyoto Parties with the achievement of sustainable development. 
 
These flexibility mechanisms thus enable states with a reduction commitment for the 
period 2008-2012 to determine whether it shall take actions domestically or abroad. This 
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decision will depend on various considerations, such as ethics, politics and economics. 
Particularly economical considerations often determine a countrys climate change policy 
and the decision to take actions abroad is often defended by the difference in marginal 
abatement costs, which are the costs of financing an emission reduction, between domestic 
and abroad. The marginal abatement cost will usually be far higher in an industrialized 
country than in a country in transition or developing country. Current economic and 
environmental research has indeed revealed that different nations would have different cost 
curves for greenhouse gases mitigation. Particularly, while some large developing countries 
and the countries in economic transition see very cheap opportunities, developed countries 
in general would face high cost curves and it might be too costly for them to achieve their 
emission reduction goals.  
 
The flexibility mechanisms could thus assist industrial states to avoid high costs in 
fulfilling their emission limitation and reduction commitments at home, and to maximise 
the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation by allowing Parties to pursue 
opportunities to cut emissions, or enhance carbon sinks, more cheaply abroad than at 
home6. As the global climate system benefits from reductions wherever they are made, then 
making reductions abroad as part of a national strategy decreases the costs of reaching 
these reduction targets and increases the chances that they will actually be reached7.  
                                                
6  See figure 1 
7  Freestone and Streck 2005, p.11. 
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Figure 1                             Source: IPCC Third Assessment Report 2001 
       
 
All Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol with emission limitation and reduction 
commitments inscribed in Annex B to the Protocol may participate in the Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms provided that certain requirements are met. One of the requirements is the 
supplementarity requirement, which requires that any use of the flexibility mechanisms 
shall be supplemental to domestic actions.8 The understanding and implications of this 
requirement is the subject of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 Kyoto Protocol, Article 6.1 (d) and 17. Article 12 is also subject to the supplementarity requirement but uses 
different wording, see Article 12.3 (b).   
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2 The Interpretation of the Supplementarity Requirement 
 
The language of the articles on the flexibility mechanisms clearly prohibits any Annex I 
party from relying entirely upon imported allowances to meet its Kyoto commitments, but 
the precise interpretation of supplemental to domestic actions has been subject to debate 
ever since the negotiations on the Framework Conventions articles on Joint 
Implementation. Already in the pilot phase for emissions reduction projects, the Parties to 
the Framework Convention recognized at COP 1 held in Berlin in 1995, under Decision 
5/CP.1(c), that Activities implemented jointly under the Convention are supplemental, and 
should only be treated as subsidiary means of achieving the objective of the Convention. 
In a similar fashion, the Kyoto Protocol mentions supplementarity, but does not define it in 
detail.  
 
Article 6 (1)(d) Kyoto Protocol on joint implementation states that The acquisition of 
emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of 
meeting commitments under Article 3. Article 12.3(b) states that Annex B Parties may 
use Certified Emission Reduction only for () compliance with part of their quantified 
emissions limitation and reduction commitments. Finally, international emissions trading 
under Article 17 shall be supplemental to domestic actions ().  
 
This chapter analyzes the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in accordance 
with Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which give place 
to a literal, systematic, and teleological interpretation. Pursuant to Article 31 not only the 
wording of the supplementarity requirement, the context, and the object and purpose of the 
term will be examined, but also subsequent agreements, such as the Bonn Agreements and 
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the Marrakech Accords. Firstly, however, the road to the supplementarity requirement in 
the Kyoto Protocol will be presented9.  
2.1 The Road to the Supplementarity Requirement in the Kyoto Protocol 
The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change envisages that efforts to address 
climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.10 More specifically, 
Article 4.2 (a), provides that each Annex I Party may implement mitigation measures 
jointly with other Parties, and Article 4.2 (d) provides that the first Conference of Parties to 
the Framework Convention shall take decisions regarding the criteria for joint 
implementation as indicated in Article 4.2 (a). The Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee, the body that negotiated the terms of the Framework Convention, held a 
preliminary discussion on the criteria for joint implementation of measures mitigating 
climate change during its Eighth Session in August 1993.11  
 
As point of departure, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee emphasized that 
efforts undertaken cooperatively between countries to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions 
could potentially achieve greater emission reductions than might be possible if each 
country pursued only domestic actions, and countries could achieve these reductions more 
cost-effectively. As joint implementation would enhance the cost-effectiveness of global 
abatement, intensify transfers of capital, investment, technology, and know-how, the 
concept was welcomed by many countries.  
 
Proposals on criteria for joint implementation (JI) were put forward by Australia, Costa 
Rica, the European Union, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, the 
United States and Uzbekistan. Norway, for instance, considered JI as an important element 
of a climate regime characterized by flexibility mechanisms that aim at global cost-
                                                
9 Article 32 VC provides that the records of the negotiating history may be used as a supplementary means of 
interpretation 
10 Article 3.3 UNFCCC 
11 See UNGA: A/AC.237/41 and UNGA: A/AC.237/35, Matters relating to commitments, criteria for joint 
implementation. 
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effectiveness without which it would be more costly and difficult to realize the objective of 
the Framework Convention in the long run. The Norwegian point of departure on the 
discussion of criteria for joint implementation was the primacy of the Framework 
Convention and the positive language pertaining to joint implementation in a number of 
Articles in the Convention. Norway argued that criteria on JI cannot annul the Articles of 
the Convention, cannot be more restrictive than the language of the Convention, cannot 
restrict the use of JI if this institute is positively allowed under the Framework Convention, 
and cannot be used to reinterpret the Convention, and in particular the nature of the specific 
commitments in Article 4.2.a and 4.2.b Framework Convention. 12 In fact, Norway argued 
against any restriction on the use of joint implementation.  
 
Several other countries, however, did propose restrictions on the joint implementation of 
mitigation measures. The EU considered that joint implementation does also entail risks of 
developments in the wrong direction13. The EU emphasized that it is in the common 
interest of both developed and developing countries to make global climate protection as 
efficient as possible and that this has to be done within the framework of equal partnership. 
It was the general view of the EU that in order to fulfil the specific commitments of Annex 
I Parties, contained in Article 4.2.b, to return their emissions individually or jointly, to their 
1990 levels, countries must limit their greenhouse gas emissions at home through their own 
actions and should not use other countries to do their work for them. They argued that it 
would be harmful for the further life of the Framework Convention if industrialized 
countries gave the impression to wish to avoid fulfilment of their own obligations to protect 
the climate by means of joint implementation. The EU, expressed concerns that if joint 
implementation could be used by industrialized states as an attempt to buy themselves 
free from reduction commitments of the Convention, it could not be expected that 
developing countries would take their commitments under Article 4.1 seriously.14 
                                                
12 UNGA:A/AC.237/Misc.33, Comments from member states on criteria for joint implementation, Paper 
nr.15 
13  UNGA:A/AC.237/Misc.33, Comments from member states on criteria for joint implementation, Paper nr.3 
14  Ibid. 
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The EU therefore believed that all Parties should implement a significant and specified 
share of any future commitments through measures taken on their own territories15. They 
considered it very important that the criteria for using joint implementation would be clear 
and transparent so that the intention of developed countries could not be misunderstood. 
The EU stated that joint as well as individual implementation of the Framework 
Convention, is bound by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
equity in accordance with respective capabilities, which involves that Annex I Parties must 
take the lead in combating climate change and its adverse effects.16 
 
Not only the EU, but also most developing countries were hostile to unrestricted joint 
implementation. Developing countries were mistrustful that trading would be used by 
developed countries to buy their way out of taking domestic action while shifting the 
actual burden of pollution control to the South17. The G-77 and China repeatedly expressed 
opposition to JI, specifically JI between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. In their proposal 
submitted at the eighth meeting of the Ad-hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, the G-77 and 
China reiterated their call for the deletion of the whole draft article18, and stated their view 
that emission limitation and reduction commitments should be met primarily through 
domestic action.19 
 
The concerns of the EU and developing countries were good illustrated by the small 
developing state Nauro. This country stated that:  
                                                
15  Switzerland, for instance, proposed a 50 per cent ceiling on the use of joint implementation. See: Depledge 
2000, par.297. 
16  UNGA:A/AC.237/Misc.37, Comments from member states on criteria for joint implementation, Paper nr.6  
17  Yamin 2005, p.5. 
18 This Draft Article on joint implementation was proposed by Chairman Estrada at the seventh meeting of 
the Ad-hoc group on the Berlin Mandate. The draft article confined joint implementation to Annex I Parties, 
but provided for the extension of the provisions to non-Annex I Parties in the event that the COP took a 
decision in accordance with the pilot phase of AIJ to allow JI between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. See 
Depledge 2000, p. 61. 
19  Depledge 2000, p.63. 
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Even if JI between developed and developing countries is cost effective in the short run, it might 
operate to the long term disadvantage of developing countries. In terms of equity, such partnerships 
could undermine the spirit of global cooperation and fairness that must be any viable long term 
solution to the climate issue. [] As recognized in the Convention, developed countries bear the 
historical responsibility for global warming. The acknowledged past inequities in greenhouse gas 
emissions may be best addressed now by reductions in such emissions in developed countries, 
together with appropriate resource flows from developed to developing countries. Joint 
implementation risks the appearance, and perhaps the reality of buying up rights to ever greater 
greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries in the future. So, JI partnerships between 
developed and developing countries raise several problems of equity and politics, including the 
perceived inequity of developed countries buying out their historical obligations in order to increase, 
rather than decrease, their own future greenhouse gas emissions.20 
 
Due to the position of the EU and developing countries, the Interim Secretariat to the INC, 
at its Ninth Session, adopted the principle that Joint implementation would be undertaken 
in conjunction with domestic actions as one of the drafted 12 principles with regard to 
joint implementation. This principle became also one of the criteria for joint 
implementation under the pilot phase which was used to give countries the opportunity to 
gain and share experiences. 
 
During the negotiations leading up to COP1 to the Convention in 1995, representatives of 
developing countries mainly remained against the mechanism of Joint Implementation. 
Moreover, critics feared that by using such joint implementation projects to achieve low-
cost greenhouse gas reductions in developing countries, industrialized countries could 
avoid investments at home and, in this manner, maintain their environmentally 
unsustainable economies. Finally, some developing countries were concerned that joint 
implementation projects would exhaust their cheap reduction options, so that if emission 
reduction commitments were to be established for developing countries at a later date, the 
targets could only be achieved at higher costs. 
                                                
20 UNGA:A/AC.237/Misc.33, Comments from member states on criteria for joint implementation, Paper 
nr.13. 
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Of all developing countries only Costa Rica embraced the concept of joint implementation 
and declared itself available for JI projects as early as 199421. During COP1, Costa Rica 
played an important mediating role as it garnered consensus in the G77 and China Group 
for a compromise proposal. Under a name variation suggested by Malaysia, the Activities 
Implemented Jointly program was established in 1995, which involved a pilot phase to 
promote learning by doing. As part of the compromise, no international tradable credits 
for joint implementation projects would be awarded during the pilot phase, which was to 
last until the end of the decade.  
 
From 1995 onwards, many of the developing countries became more and more interested in 
joint implementation projects, especially between developed and developing countries. In 
the last six months of 1997, Brazil took the lead in defining the essential features of the 
Clean Development Mechanism, which would function as a mechanism to channel 
sustainable development resources to developing countries, while allowing industrialized 
countries to purchase emission reduction units achieved by projects under the CDM to 
partially meet their reduction commitments. The proposal was backed by G77 and China, 
and ultimately approved by the COP under article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Despite initial opposition by developing countries to unrestricted joint implementation 
projects under the Framework Convention, the market mechanism developed into three 
different flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol; joint implementation, the clean 
development mechanisms, and international emissions trading. Indeed, as the CDM 
allowed for developing country participation, this removed one of the major points of 
disagreement in the discussions on joint implementation projects. Hence, after accepting 
the basic concept of a project-based mechanisms in the context of the CDM, it would have 
been inconsistent for developing countries to further oppose Joint Implementation among 
                                                
21  As to the supplementarity requirement, Costa Rica had proposed that Annex I Parties could meet up to 25 
per cent of their domestic emission reduction obligations through joint implementation projects. Depledge 
2000, par. 297. 
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industrialized countries. After some further negotiations among industrialized countries, 
Article 6 was agreed in principle after the first week of negotiations in Kyoto.22  
 
As to international emissions trading, which was advocated by the non-EU industrialized 
countries but opposed by the EU and developing countries, the problem of diverging 
positions was solved by the statement in Article 17 that the COP shall define principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines for emissions trading. The Kyoto Protocol allowed thus 
for emissions trading, however further work would be required on it by the COP. 
Addressing the concerns of the EU and developing countries however, did lead to the 
inclusions of the phrase that use of emissions trading shall be supplemental to domestic 
actions.23 The meaning of this phrase is the subject of the following paragraphs, which 
analyse the supplementarity requirement through the general rule of interpretation stated in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  
2.2 The interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in the light of Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
The general rule of interpretation in Article 31 Vienna Convention provides for an 
interpretation in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.24  The context 
for the purpose of the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement shall comprise not 
only the text of the relevant articles in the Kyoto Protocol, but also, more importantly, the 
preamble and the text of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and furthermore, 
subsequent agreements between the Kyoto Parties adopted by the Conferences of Parties. 
2.2.1 The ordinary meaning of the term supplemental to domestic actions. 
The wording supplemental to domestic actions in the requirement that any use of the 
flexibility  mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of 
meeting commitments under Article 3, indicates that domestic actions should be the main 
                                                
22 Obertr and Ott 1999, p.157. 
23 Article 17 Kyoto Protocol. 
24 See Cassesse 2005 
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means of meeting emission limitation and reduction commitments, and that the use of 
mechanisms should be supplemental to that domestic action. Supplemental in this phrase 
means that the Kyoto mechanisms may be used to complete domestic actions for the 
purpose of meeting a quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment. They could 
be used to make up for a deficiency in case domestic actions would not be enough to attain 
the specific Kyoto target, or the mechanisms could be used to extend or strengthen the 
whole.25 A textual interpretation of the supplementarity requirement clearly underlines the 
importance of domestic actions and attributes only a limited role to the flexibility 
mechanisms.  
2.2.2 The object and purpose of the supplementarity requirement 
The negotiating history of the supplementarity requirement has clarified that the object and 
purpose of the requirement is to ensure that Kyoto Annex I Parties do not escape from 
taking a certain amount of emission reduction measures at home. This concerns especially 
developed Annex I Parties which face high abatement costs in fulfilling their emission 
limitation and reduction commitments at home. Without the supplementarity requirement 
these countries could, instead of reducing emissions at home, use flexibility mechanisms 
and buy the extra allowances they need to fulfil their Kyoto commitments. Related to this is 
the purpose to increase the contribution of domestic actions, which eventually should result 
in a fundamental change in Annex I Parties consumption and production patterns. This 
would contribute to reversing the unsustainable development trends in industrialized 
countries, to the effective long-term reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and to the 
long-term survival of the climate regime26.  
2.2.3 The context of the supplementarity requirement 
A thorough interpretation of the supplementarity requirement needs a consideration of the 
context of the requirement and more specifically of the Framework Conventions preamble 
and guiding principles. The Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol are based upon 
a number of important principles among which the principles of equity, sustainable 
                                                
25 The Legal Oxford Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 
26  See further chapter 4. 
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development, and common but differentiated responsibilities.27 Besides these principles, 
Article 3.3 Framework Convention underlines the importance of cost-effectiveness and 
states that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as 
to ensure global benefits and the lowest possible cost. This section discusses these 
principles.  
2.2.3.1     Equity and the Principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
Under the Framework Convention, all the Parties undertake to be guided on the basis of 
equity in their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention, and Annex I Parties 
agree to take into account the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of 
them to the global effort regarding the achievement of the objective of the Convention28. A 
common interpretation of equity in the context of climate change is the concept of 
(historical) responsibility. Because the Annex I Parties produced the majority of historical 
greenhouse gas emissions, they should not completely buy their way out of their 
responsibilities by purchasing cheap credits, permits or assigned amounts from abroad, but 
rather that they should clean up their own mess by fundamentally changing their 
consumption and production patterns through domestic action29. It would thus be unfair or 
irresponsible if Annex I Parties would not reduce any emissions at home. Therefore, the 
use of flexibility mechanisms should be legally restricted. 
 
However, to some extent, the historical responsibility approach to equity has already been 
established in the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol through the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. Indeed, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities has provided an answer to questions such as how to allocate 
future responsibilities for environmental protection between states which are at different 
levels of economic development, which have contributed in different degrees to particular 
problems, and which have different environmental and developmental needs and priorities. 
The principle recognises that although countries have common responsibilities to protect 
                                                
27 Article 3.3 UNFCCC 
28  UNFCCC Article 3.1 and 4.2(a).  
29 Woerdman 2002, p. 353 
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the climate system, countries have also different responsibilities with regard to the 
preservation of the climate system because not every country has contributed to the same 
extent to climate change and because not all countries have the same resources to denote to 
the problem. There should be taken into account the differences in Parties starting points 
and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and 
sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as 
well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the 
global effort regarding the Conventions objective30.  
 
Nearly all commitments set out in the UNFCCC are differentiated: more detailed 
commitments have been taken on by a total of 41 developed countries that are listed in 
Annex I31. The obligations for developed states were further specified in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. At its core lie legally binding targets for the developed country Parties to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions over the 2008-2012 period. The principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities with no binding reduction commitments for developing 
countries, acknowledges that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate 
international response. The application of this principle contributed to developing countries 
becoming party to the Kyoto Protocol. This is a very important factor because although 
these countries are not subject to legally binding reduction commitments for the first 
commitment period, they should become subject to commitments in the next period. 
 
                                                
30  UNFCCC Article 4.2(a) 
31  Article 4.2 requires developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I to take the lead in 
modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention. 
Moreover, developed country Parties should assist developing country Parties in meeting the costs of 
adaptation to the adverse effect of climate change and should provide them with financial resources and 
technology. Finally, developed country Parties should take fully into account that economic and social 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties. 
See further UNFCCC Articles 4.3, 4.4, and 4.7. 
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While there are authors who argue that the equity principle requires a legal restriction on 
the use of the flexibility mechanism, other authors argue that there is no need for that 
because of the fact that equity considerations are already taken into account through the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the Framework Convention and 
the Kyoto Protocol32. Still, when there are provisions in these agreements subject to 
diverging interpretations, the equity principle should be used as a guidance in finding an 
effective interpretation of such a provision. Accordingly, it could be justified to place an 
extra burden on those Parties which already are subject to more stringent commitments, on 
the condition that that would be equitable.  
2.2.3.2 Cost- effectiveness 
According to Article 3.3 of the Framework Convention, policies and measures to deal with 
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest 
possible costs. This principle lies behind the flexibility mechanisms. The flexibility 
mechanisms are market mechanisms which are based on international trade cooperation in 
mitigating climate change. As such they provide a cost-effective manner for Annex I 
parties to meet their binding reduction commitments. Any ceiling on the use of the 
flexibility mechanism would increase the costs of reaching the limitation and reduction 
commitments for developed countries, and thereby reduce cost-effectiveness.   
2.2.3.3 Sustainable development 
The principle of sustainable development has been referred to several times both in the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and in the Kyoto Protocol. However, the exact 
meaning of this principle has been subject to discussion ever since its inception in the 
Report Our Common Future of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
in 1987. The Commission defined the principle as follows: Sustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising future generations 
to meet their own needs.33.  
 
                                                
32  See, for instance, Banuri 1996. See further chapter 4.  
33   World Commission on Environment and Development 1987. 
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This apparently simple phrase has been subject to a large amount of literature, in particular 
on the components of the principle. Sands (2003) for instance, argues that the principle of 
sustainable development appears to consist of four elements which together comprise the 
legal elements of the concept of sustainable development34. The first element is the 
principle of intergenerational equity, which requires the need to preserve natural resources 
for the benefit of future generations. Secondly, the principle of intragenerational equity, 
which requires the equitable use of natural resources and implies that use by one state 
must take account of the needs of other states. Thirdly, the principle of sustainable use, 
which means the aim of exploiting natural resources in a manner which is sustainable. The 
fourth element is the principle of integration, which leads to the need to ensure that 
environmental considerations are integrated into economic and other development plans, 
programmes and projects, and that development needs are taken into account in applying 
environmental objectives. 
 
Many other authors and institutions have attempted to define the principle of sustainable 
development35. In the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 
2002, the Plan of Action recognized that poverty eradication, changing unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption, and protection and managing the natural resource 
base of economic and social development are overarching objectives of, and essential 
requirements for, sustainable development36. While definitions on sustainable development 
vary in their extension, the principle can be shortly described as a multifaceted concept 
covering integration of economic, social and environmental concerns, equity and justice 
between generations and within the present generation.37 It is explained by Voigt that 
while there is no doubt that balancing these factors is pivotal for sustainable development, 
it does not necessarily mean treating all three in the same manner38. In fact, this author 
                                                
34  Sands 2003, p.253. 
35 See for instance, International Law Association New Delhi Declaration, Resolution 3/2002, annexed to UN 
document A/57/329. 
36 World summit on sustainable development 2002. 
37 Voigt 2007. 
38 Voigt 2006, p.52-53. 
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argues that climate stability by the protection of a safe global climate system is of 
overarching priority, and that priority must be given to protect fundamental life-
supporting system in principle and in practice39. In practice, sustainable development thus 
requires an integration of the various components within the framework set out by the 
ultimate objective of the climate convention40.  
 
The need to integrate the various interests of developed and developing countries, and to 
integrate various concepts, such as equity, cost-effectiveness, and environmental 
effectiveness, as demanded by the principle of sustainable development, challenges the 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement since the flexibility mechanisms and the 
legal restriction to use them protect a number of apparently diverging interests.  
 
On the one hand, all three flexibility mechanisms provide a cost-effective manner to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions globally. As developed country Parties are subject to more 
stringent limitation and reduction commitments, following from the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities, the flexibility mechanisms play a significant role in 
achieving the common reduction target of Article 3.1 Kyoto Protocol. This is an important 
aspect of the climate regime since a considerable reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
globally amounts to the preservation of the climate system, and thereby to intergenerational 
equity; preserving the climate system for the benefit of future generations. 
 
On the other hand, however, use of the flexibility mechanisms also raises questions as to 
intragenerational equity. As most greenhouse gas emissions come from industrialized 
countries, these countries should also take domestic actions in order to reverse their 
unsustainable development trends. This would amount to sustainability of the legal climate 
regime and of the natural climate system. Indeed, in the long term, preservation of the 
climate system requires deep cuts in industrialized country emissions by, for instance, 
making fundamental changes to the way energy is produced and used in these countries. 
                                                
39 Ibid, p.52 and 88. 
40 Ibid, p.52 
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Moreover, if these industrialized countries do not undertake domestic actions to reduce 
greenhouse gases domestically, it would be unrealistic and unreasonable to assume that 
developing countries will take on significant reduction targets if industrialized countries 
decline to do so on the grounds of costs41.  
 
Although sustainable development does not point at a particular interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement, a certain limit on the use of the flexibility mechanisms 
appears to be in line with the principle. From the perspective of the principle and the need 
to integrate equity and cost-effectiveness and environmental integrity, the supplementarity 
requirement could be considered a necessity. In fact, without the requirement, certain 
components of sustainable development would become subordinate to the idea of cost-
effectiveness, which undermines the principle. 
 
An interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in accordance with the principle of 
sustainable development is further elaborated on in paragraph 4.5.1. 
2.2.4 In sum  
An interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in accordance with Article 31 § 1 and 
2 of the Vienna Convention recognizes the importance of domestic actions for various 
reasons, but recognizes also that the flexibility mechanisms play an important role in 
reducing the costs of meeting Kyoto commitments, enhancing the achievability of those 
commitments and thus the effectiveness of the global climate regime. Although an 
interpretation in accordance with Article 31 § 1 and 2 helps understanding the importance 
of the flexibility mechanisms and the need to restrict the use of them to some extent, it does 
not put forward a more detailed and workable guideline on how to interpret the term 
supplemental to domestic actions in practice. Subsequent agreements adopted after the 
Kyoto Protocol might clarify the supplementarity requirement more thoroughly and will 
therefore be discussed in the next section. 
                                                
41  Yamin 2004, p.208 
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2.3 Subsequent agreements on the supplementarity requirement   
The provisions in the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol have been 
extensively elaborated by the Framework Conventions governing institutional body, the 
Conference of the Parties (COP). Furthermore, both the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) have 
contributed significantly to the preparatory work needed for consideration by the COP on 
the definition of relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines,  [for the flexibility 
mechanisms]42. 
 
At COP 4, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina from 2 to 13 November 1998, the COP decided 
on a work programme on the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol with a view to 
taking a decision on all these mechanisms at COP 643. In general, the work programme 
invited Parties to submit proposals on principles, modalities, rules and guidelines for the 
mechanisms. More specifically, the programme required not only a general interpretation 
on supplementarity, but also a determination of the part of commitments under articles 3 
and 12.2. With regard to the interpretation of supplementarity requirement in the articles 3, 
6.1(d), 12.2, 12.7, and 17, Parties were invited to submit proposals on whether there should 
be defined a concrete ceiling in quantitative and qualitative terms based on equitable 
criteria44. 
 
Proposals varied from a concrete ceiling to no ceiling at all on the use of the flexibility 
mechanisms. This is illustrated by the response of, on the one hand, the European 
Community and its member States and Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland (the EU 
and Switzerland), and on the other hand Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, 
                                                
42  FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (Decision 1/CP.3)  
43  The Buenos Aires Action Plan. 
44  FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 
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Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine and United States (the Umbrella Group) to the 
questions on the supplementarity requirement submitted by the Group of 77 & China.45 
 
The Group of 77 & China expressed that the Kyoto mechanisms should be supplemental to 
domestic action, but submitted a list of issues and questions which needed to be properly 
assessed first. Among the questions were the following: 
 
 ► How to ensure that domestic actions by developed countries are their primary 
 means of GHG limitation and reduction, and that the overseas mechanisms remain  
 supplemental to such domestic actions by developed countries for the purpose of 
 meeting their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments? 
 ► How to define and quantify part in ...part of quantified emission limitation 
 and reduction commitments, in Article 12.3 (b) of the Protocol? 
 ► How to ensure that any emissions trading between the developed country Parties 
 shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting their 
 quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments? 
 
The EU and Switzerland emphasized that the use of flexibility mechanisms should be 
supplemental to domestic actions and that domestic actions should thus provide the main 
means of meeting commitments under Article 3. The EU stated that Annex I Parties overall 
should achieve a significant reduction in their emissions domestically, and argued that a 
concrete ceiling on the use of all the flexible mechanisms had to be established.  
 
The Umbrella Group, however, argued that although Articles 6 and 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol require that JI and IET are to be supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purpose of meeting commitments under Article 3, the Kyoto Protocol does not call for 
domestic actions to be the primary means of limiting greenhouse gas emissions. 
Concerning the suggestion that the carefully negotiated compromise term supplemental in 
Articles 6 and 17 be quantified, the Group argued that such an approach is neither 
                                                
45  FCCC/CP/1998/MISC.7 
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authorized nor required by the Kyoto Protocol. In their opinion, international emissions 
trading would be more effective in achieving emission reductions at the lowest cost if there 
are no restrictions on the use of flexibility mechanisms to meet the commitments under 
Article 3. The ability to trade without a quantitative restriction would encourage earlier 
emission reductions and minimise the overall cost of achieving the collective Annex I 
environmental objective. Indeed, internationally mandated limits on the quantity available 
to be traded, by substantially reducing the benefits available from trading, would increase 
the cost of emission reductions, and ultimately, in the long term, reduce the quantity of 
reductions that can be achieved, thus delivering less environmental benefit. Furthermore, 
the Umbrella Group did not agree that the COP/MOP should seek to quantify part of in 
article 12.3 (b) because, for instance, fewer projects would then be initiated and therefore 
direct benefits, such as new technology or investment, to non-Annex I Parties would be 
reduced. 
 
These two negotiating parties clearly took highly diverging positions on the issue of 
supplementarity46. Hence, it was difficult for the Conference of Parties to agree on a 
general interpretation on the supplementarity requirement in the Kyoto Protocol at that 
time. Therefore, for the fifth Conference of Parties, held in Bonn, Germany from 25 
October to 5 November 1999, the Chairmen of the Subsidiary Bodies provided a synthesis 
of proposals by all Kyoto Parties on principles, modalities, rules and guidelines which 
could be of help to elucidate the forming of a common interpretation on the 
supplementarity requirement47.  
 
While the Umbrella Group recalled their opposition to a ceiling on the use of the flexibility 
mechanisms, the EU and Switzerland recalled their position that a concrete ceiling on the 
                                                
46  The position of the African Group and of developing countries was comparable with that of the EU and 
Switzerland. The African Group stated that the primary objective of the Framework Convention is to take 
action domestically to reduce emissions. The use of flexible mechanisms, therefore, should be limited to an 
agreed percentage of the emissions targets provided in the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I Parties. See 
FCCC/CP/1998/MISC.7 add.2 (Paper by Uganda on behalf of the Africa Group) 
47  FCCC/SB/1999/INF.2 
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use of the Kyoto mechanisms should be defined in quantitative and qualitative terms based 
on equitable criteria. In the view of the latter, a properly defined ceiling would encourage 
Annex I Parties to develop stringent domestic policies and measures in order to modify 
long-term emissions trends, the technological structure, especially long-lives infrastructure, 
and production and consumption patterns. Thereby, the ceiling would also contribute to 
preparing the path for more ambitious commitments in the second and subsequent 
commitment periods. The definition of supplementarity of the EU and Switzerland roughly 
implied that 50 per cent of the Kyoto commitments should be achieved domestically via a 
ceiling on the Kyoto mechanisms48.   
 
The Group of 77 and China stated that guidelines on supplementarity must take into 
account articles 2 and 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol and that developed country access to the 
mechanisms should be contingent on satisfaction of prescribed domestic effort in fulfilment 
of commitments under Article 3.  
 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) believed that the design of all three 
mechanisms should firmly rest on three basic design principles: scientific and regulatory 
certainty; environmental and cost-effectiveness; and equity between Parties, and that 
therefore, the use of mechanisms by any Annex I Party had to be supplemental to its 
domestic action. AOSIS was concerned that an over-dependence of certain Annex I Parties 
on the use of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms to achieve their commitments may 
undermine their ability, firstly, to fulfil commitments domestically, secondly, to 
demonstrate supplementarity, and thirdly,  to undertake more ambitious commitments in 
                                                
48  More specifically, the EU proposed the following definition: Net acquisitions by an Annex B Party for all three Kyoto 
mechanisms together must not exceed the higher of the following alternatives: 
Five per cent of its base year emissions multiplied by five plus its assigned amount  
      2 
Or: Fifty per cent of the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year of the period from 1994 to 2002, 
multiplied by five and its assigned amount 
      2  
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the next round of negotiations. AOSIS thus also strongly supported the concept of 
supplementarity.  
 
Based on these proposals by Parties, the Chairmen of the Subsidiary Bodies submitted a 
consolidated text entitled "Consolidated text on principles, modalities, rules and 
guidelines", which served as a basis for further negotiations on the flexibility mechanisms 
pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol49. Indeed, based on this 
Consolidated text the sixth Conference of Parties Part I, held at The Hague from 13 to 25 
November 2000, presented four options for the general interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement in all three Kyoto Protocol articles50. 
 
The four options on Part of/Supplementarity in the Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol presented were: 
 
1. No elaboration of supplementarity. 
2. Parties included in Annex I shall meet their emission limitation and reduction 
commitments primarily through domestic action. [Use of the mechanisms pursuant 
to Articles 6, 12 and 17 by a Party included in Annex I shall be limited to a 
maximum of 30 per cent of the effort required to meet its commitment under Article 
3. This ceiling may be reviewed periodically by the COP/MOP.] Compliance with 
this requirement will be assessed by the compliance committee on the basis of 
information submitted under Article 7. 
3. Net acquisitions by a Party included in Annex B for all three mechanisms pursuant 
to Articles 6, 12 and 17 together must not exceed the higher of the following 
alternatives: 
 (a) 5 per cent of its base year emissions multiplied by 5 plus its assigned amount 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      2  
                                                
49  FCCC/SB/2000/4 
50  FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.3 (Vol. V) 
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 (where base year emissions may be replaced by average annual emissions in the 
 base period, as provided for in Article 3, paragraph 5); 
 
 (b) 50 per cent of the difference between its annual actual emissions in any year of 
 the period from 1994 to 2002, multiplied by 5 and its assigned amount. 
 
 However, the ceiling on net acquisitions can be increased to the extent that a Party 
 included in Annex B achieves emission reductions larger than the relevant ceiling in 
 the commitment period through domestic action undertaken after 1993, if  
 demonstrated by the Party in a verifiable manner and subject to the expert review 
 process to be developed under Article 8. 
 
 Net transfers by a Party included in Annex B for all three mechanisms pursuant to 
 Articles 6, 12 and 17 together must not exceed: 
 5 per cent of: its base year emissions multiplied by 5 plus its assigned amount 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      2 
 
 (where base year emissions may be replaced by average annual emissions in the 
 base period, as provided for in Article 3, paragraph 5). 
 
 However, the ceiling on net transfers can be increased to the extent that a Party 
 included in Annex B achieves emission reductions larger than the relevant ceiling in 
 the commitment period through domestic action undertaken after 1993, if 
 demonstrated by the Party in a verifiable manner and subject to the expert review 
 process to be developed under Article 8. If a Party is a member of an Article 4 
 agreement to fulfil commitments jointly, the assigned amount is the assigned 
 amount allocated to the Party under that agreement. Otherwise, it is the assigned 
 amount for the Party as calculated in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 7.51 
 
4. Article 3 establishes emission limitation and reduction commitments for Parties 
included in Annex I, consequent to which domestic actions shall be the principal 
                                                
51  This third option was based upon the EU proposal which roughly implied a ceiling of 50 per cent. 
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means for each such Party to achieve its commitments. The participation of each 
Party included in Annex I in the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 shall 
be contingent on that Party demonstrating through the Protocols procedures and 
mechanisms on compliance that domestic actions will constitute the principal means 
of achieving its Article 3 commitments. For the purposes of compliance with 
Article 3 commitments, each Party included in Annex I shall limit its use of the 
mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 collectively which shall not exceed X 
per cent of that Partys assigned amount pursuant to their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments as inscribed in Annex B. 
 
The difficulty of agreeing on the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement was 
clearly illustrated when COP-6 Part II, held in Bonn in July 2001, instead of choosing for 
one of the four options as a definite interpretation of supplementarity, adopted the Bonn 
Agreement on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action with a vague and 
open definition of the supplementarity requirement in the articles 6, 12 and 1752. According 
to the Bonn Agreement the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic 
actions, and domestic actions shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made 
by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1. While the EU had argued for a quantitative 
cap, the Umbrella Group wanted maximum flexibility, which implied no cap. Due to their 
bargaining power, the latter position prevailed. Moreover, one of the eligibility 
requirements for participation in the flexibility mechanisms, namely reporting on 
supplementarity, was deleted from the list53.  
 
The EU had apparently given up its proposal and accepted the unspecified requirement that 
domestic action shall be a significant element of Annex I countries efforts54. The EU 
                                                
52  FCCC/CP/2001/5, the Bonn Agreement for the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. 
53  Dessai 2003, p.151. 
54 The term significant literally means extensive or important enough to merit attention (see Compact 
Oxford English dictionary). 
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made this compromise at COP 6 Part II to prevent that some Umbrella countries would 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol like the US had done a few months earlier in March 
2001. This largely unexpected US decision had changed the game and the EU, who 
believed in the Kyoto Protocol but was sceptic to unrestricted emissions trading, rather had 
a market-based Protocol than no Protocol at all55. Yet some of the environmental concerns 
of the EU were accommodated at COP 6 Part II by means of restrictions on the use of sinks 
and the requirement, among other things, that each Annex I Party shall maintain a 
commitment period reserve which should not drop below 90 per cent of its assigned 
amount56.  
 
The phrase in the Bonn Agreement that the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental 
to domestic actions, and domestic actions shall thus constitute a significant element of the 
effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments under Article 3.1 seems contra dictionary. The wording 
supplemental to domestic actions implies that the Kyoto mechanisms may be used to 
complete domestic actions, that they could be used to make up for a deficiency, or that the 
mechanisms could be used to extend or strengthen the whole57. The wording of the phrase 
in the Bonn Agreement, however, suggest that domestic actions only have to constitute a 
significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.1, which would 
imply that states could, as the principal means, rely on the use of mechanisms to meet any 
commitments. 
 
The Bonn Agreement not only introduced a new phrase on supplementarity, but it also 
added that the Parties included in Annex I shall implement domestic actions in accordance 
with national circumstances and with a view to reducing emissions in a manner conducive 
to narrowing per capita differences between developed and developing country Parties 
                                                
55  Woerdman  2002, p. 338. 
56  Ibid 
57  See p.15. 
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while working towards achievement of the ultimate objective of the Convention.58 This 
converging or narrowing approach seems to lay down a new criterion for Annex I Parties 
to meet59. Even though the wording with a view to does not seem to implicate a strong 
obligation, the phrase could be important for the interpretation of the supplementarity 
requirement. For domestic actions to be considered a significant element of the effort 
made by an Annex I Party, these domestic actions would need to contribute to narrowing 
down per capita emission differences between developed and developing countries. As 
Annex I Parties are supposed to continue reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the question 
then becomes: how much domestic action is necessary to result in a decrease in per capita 
Annex I country greenhouse gas emissions and thus in converging per capita emission 
levels? 
 
As an illustration, in 2003 Norway had a per capita emission level of 12.1 tonnes CO2 
equivalents, with a total emission level of 54,8 million tonnes60. Suppose a non-Annex I 
Party had a per capita emission level of about 3.1 million tonnes CO2 equivalents, the 
difference would then be 9 Mt. Use of the flexibility mechanisms might involve that 
Norway meets its Kyoto commitments, but it does not as such result in a decrease in per 
capita greenhouse gas emissions in Norway. On the contrary, emissions trading, for 
instance, entails that a Kyoto Party such as Norway, which has a difficulty in meeting its 
greenhouse gas reduction commitments, purchases allowances from a Party which finds it 
relatively easy to meet its commitments. Consequently, Norway becomes entitled to emit 
                                                
58  The Marrakesh Accords, adopted at COP-7, uses the same wording as used in the Bonn Agreement. The 
well-known expressions, that the use of the flexibility mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action, 
that domestic action shall constitute a significant element of Parties efforts, and that domestic action must be 
taken with a view to converge per capita emission differences between developed and developing countries, 
are stated not only in the preamble to the Draft decision/CMP.1 but also in the Draft decision itself. This 
could imply that the supplementarity requirement is not only considered a guideline by the COP but instead a 
criteria which countries have to met, (see further Chapter 3). For the text of the Marrakesh Accord see: The 
Marrakech Accords & the Marrakech Declaration, http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf.  
59  In general, the convergence approach involves that per capita emissions of developed countries and 
developing countries converge to the same low level within a few decades. 
60  See  <http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/country.cfm?country=NO&indicatorid=199> 
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more and its per capita greenhouse gas emission level increases instead of decreases. In 
accordance with the requirement to implement domestic actions  in a manner conducive 
to narrowing per capita differences between developed and developing country Parties, 
Norwegian domestic actions would be needed to counteract the per capita increase 
resulting from the use of the flexibility mechanisms.  
 
The amount of domestic actions necessary for Annex I Parties to converge per capita 
emission differences depends particularly on whether the country is an allowance buyer or 
seller. Especially Norway faces high abatement costs and is therefore considered an 
allowance buyer61. While all Annex I Parties have to undertake domestic actions in a 
manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences between developed and developing 
country Parties, Parties which buy many allowances from other Parties need to undertake 
domestic actions of such a degree that these actions also counteracts the positive effects on 
the per capita emission level resulting from the use of the flexibility mechanisms. These 
Kyoto Parties thus face a higher burden than other Parties. 
 
An interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in accordance with the convergence 
approach seems reasonably defendable in theory; however, in practice such an 
interpretation entails a number of difficulties. Firstly, the approach might lead to an 
unacceptable burden for some developed countries and for all fast growing countries with 
high fossil energy intensity62. Moreover, the approach is rejected by advanced developing 
countries with high greenhouse gas emissions, such as China, because they would have to 
reduce emissions as developed countries with the same per capita emissions, although their 
historical responsibility is smaller63.  
 
Secondly, the convergence approach might not be in line with the Annex I Parties 
commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. As the convergence approach requires developed 
                                                
61  Cicero Report 1998:1. 
62  Ghersi 2003. 
63  Höhne 2006. 
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countries to reduce their per capita greenhouse gas emissions level, the Kyoto Protocol 
allows some developed countries, for instance Norway, to increase their emissions during 
the first commitment period compared to 1990. In this situation, the convergence approach 
does not provide sufficient clarification as to the interpretation of the supplementarity 
requirement. 
 
Frankly, the text of the Kyoto Protocol and of subsequent agreements do not provide the 
international community with a threshold on the level of domestic actions necessary to be 
considered a significant element of Annex I parties effort. The convergence approach 
might provide some guidance on the design of a future climate regime in general, however 
with regard to a useful interpretation on the supplementarity requirement it contains 
shortcomings. Consequently, the international community has remained left with the vague 
wording of the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords. From 2001 onwards, the 
negotiators have had many years to provide a more concrete interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement. However, at the first Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 
December 2005, the supplementarity requirement was formulated in exactly the same way 
as in the Bonn Agreement and in the Marrakech Accords.64 
2.4 Conclusions  
An interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in the Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties does not provide us with an effective and usable interpretation. While Kyoto 
Parties have taken differing positions on the supplementarity requirement ever since the 
negotiations on joint implementation under the Framework Convention, they never reached 
an official agreement on a concrete ceiling on the use of the flexibility mechanisms or the 
amount of domestic actions required to meet their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3.1 Kyoto Protocol. As a result the supplementarity 
requirement was only mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol, but not defined in detail. 
                                                
64 See decision 2/CMP.1 
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Subsequent agreements were aimed at defining relevant principles, modalities, rules and 
guidelines for the flexibility mechanisms and supplementarity requirement. The wording of 
the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakesh Accords provides for the following optional 
interpretation; the requirement that the use of the flexibility mechanisms shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions entails that domestic actions shall constitute a significant 
element of the effort made by each Annex I Party to  meet its quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments. This requirement could be interpreted from the 
statement in the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakesh Accords that the Annex I Parties shall 
implement domestic actions in accordance with national circumstances and with a view to 
reducing emissions in a manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences between 
developed and developing country Parties. In order to constitute a significant element, 
domestic actions need to be of such magnitude that they positively affect the aim of 
converging per capita emission differences.  
 
The practical implications of this assertion would vary from country to country and would 
depend in particular on the height of the abatement costs and the extent to which a country 
needs to make use of flexibility mechanisms to meet its Kyoto commitments. Indeed, an 
Annex I Party finding it relatively easy to meet its targets needs to undertake less domestic 
action than a country which buys a lot of allowances from other Annex I Parties, because 
the more emission allowances a country buys, the more its per capita emission level will 
increase, and the more domestic actions are necessary to counteract that increase. An 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in accordance with the convergence 
approach sounds reasonably defendable from the wording of the Bonn Agreement; 
however it is an ineffective interpretation as it raises many theoretical and practical 
difficulties, including issues of morality, equity, costs, and usability.  
 
Although the Conference of Parties has not defined supplementarity in a quantitative way, 
the COP did lay down the substantive requirement of showing that the use of mechanisms 
is supplemental to domestic actions and that domestic actions constitute a significant 
element of the effort made by Annex I Party. Secondly, the COP decided on a reporting 
requirement which entails that Annex I Parties have to report on how its domestic actions 
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constitutes a significant element of the effort made to meet its Article 3.1 target. Thirdly, 
the Marrakesh Accords requires expert review teams to provide a detailed examination of a 
number of issues, including supplementarity relating to mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 
12 and 17.65  
 
As the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement has not given a satisfying answer 
to the question as to what extent Kyoto Parties could make use of the flexibility 
mechanisms in order to meet their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments, state practice could clarify the role of the supplementarity requirement in 
current climate change policy. The next chapter assesses the implementation of the 
supplementarity requirement and of the specific review and reporting requirements within 
the European Union and several Umbrella countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
65  These three requirements were reiterated at first Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005. See decisions 
2/CMP.1, 15/CMP.1, and 22/CMP.1  
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3 The Implementation of the Supplementarity requirement 
 
Article 31.3.b Vienna Convention states that to determine the interpretation of a provision, 
there shall be taken into account any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty. 
While the previous chapter aimed to elucidate the interpretation of the supplementarity 
requirement in accordance with Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, this chapter is 
particularly devoted to examine whether any conclusions on the interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement can be drawn based upon current state practice. This chapter 
considers whether the implementation of the supplementarity requirement in the Articles 6, 
12 and 17 establishes an agreement of the Parties regarding the interpretation in the view 
of Article 31.3.b Vienna Convention.  
 
First, this chapter clarifies the Kyoto Protocol compliance system and its reporting and 
review requirements. Second, the chapter presents a substantive overview of the 
implementation of the supplementarity requirement by a number of selected Annex I 
Parties, namely the European Union, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, and 
Norway. The section assesses the nature of domestic policies and measures, the amount of 
total domestic actions, and their intention to make use of the flexibility mechanisms to meet 
their Kyoto targets. Finally, the ratio of domestic efforts and use of the flexibility 
mechanisms will be calculated in order to reveal the significance of domestic efforts in 
comparison with the use of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. This section concludes with an 
assessment of the significance of the supplementarity requirement in practice, in the light 
of the Kyoto Protocol compliance mechanism.  
 
Besides presenting the implementation of the supplementarity requirement in the view of 
the Kyoto Protocol compliance mechanism, this chapter also assesses the implementation 
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of the supplementarity requirement within the European Union, the Party which favoured a  
ceiling on the use of the flexibility mechanisms. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) will be discussed, as well as the Linking Directive which enables use of the projects-
based mechanisms to be linked to the EU ETS. In this context, Norways connection to the 
EU scheme will also be considered. 
3.1 Reporting and Review Requirements 
While there is no methodology available to define supplementarity in a quantitative way, 
there are substantive, reporting and review requirements on supplementarity relating to the 
mechanisms. In accordance with the Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and 
subsequent decisions, all Annex I Parties are required to submit regular 
communications66. These national communications by Annex I Parties should provide 
information on how its use of the mechanisms is supplemental to domestic action, and 
how domestic actions thus constitute a significant element of the effort made to meet its 
quantified limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1.67 Until 
now, Kyoto Annex I Parties were required to submit four national communications. The 
fourth national communication was due 1 January 2006. All selected Annex I Parties 
submitted their fourth national communication. 
 
Besides National Communications, Annex I Parties are required to submit reports on 
demonstrable progress68. According to the brief guidelines outlined in Decision 22/CP.7 
par.4 and Decision 25/CP.8, drafted by the COP/MOP, a report on demonstrable progress 
must include a description of domestic measures aimed at preparing for the implementation 
of mitigation commitments under the Protocol, including legal and institutional steps and 
programmes for domestic compliance and enforcement. The report must also include trends 
in, and projections of, greenhouse gas emissions, along with an evaluation of how the 
described domestic measures will contribute to the achievement of a Partys emission 
commitments, in the light of these trends and projections. 
                                                
66  Art. 4.1.j and 12 UNFCCC. 
67   In accordance with the provisions of decision 5/CP.6, decision 22/CMP.1 and 15/CMP.1-annex. 
68  Article 3.2 Kyoto Protocol. 
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The information submitted by the Parties is to be assessed by the Facilitative Branch of the 
Compliance Committee. The mandate of the facilitative branch is to provide advice and 
facilitation to Parties in implementing the Protocol, and to promote compliance by Parties 
with their Kyoto commitments.  It is responsible for addressing questions of 
implementation by Annex I Parties of response measures aimed at mitigating climate 
change in a way that minimizes their adverse impacts on developing countries and the use 
by Annex I Parties of the mechanisms as supplemental to domestic action.  Furthermore, 
the facilitative branch may provide early warning of potential non-compliance with 
emissions targets, methodological and reporting commitments relating to greenhouse gas 
inventories, and commitments on reporting supplementary information in a Partys annual 
inventory. The Facilitative Branch will base its deliberations on reports from expert review 
teams, the subsidiary bodies, Parties and other official sources.69 
 
The information submitted by Annex I Parties will, in first instance, be reviewed by expert 
review teams70. The Kyoto Protocol characterises the review process as consisting of a 
thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of a Partys 
implementation of the Protocol.71 The individual review provides an assessment of the 
completeness of the national communication, along with a detailed examination of each of 
its sections and how the information presented therein was arrived at. The review provides, 
for instance, a detailed examination of supplementarity information provided under Article 
7 paragraph 2, which includes information on supplementarity relating to the mechanisms 
pursuant to Article 6, 12 and 17.72 Furthermore, the provision that Annex I Parties shall 
implement domestic actions in accordance with national circumstances and with a view to 
reducing emissions in a manner conducive to narrowing per capita differences between 
developed and developing country Parties while working towards achievement of the 
                                                
69  See <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/introduction/items/3024.php> 
70  Article 8.1 Kyoto Protocol. See decisions  2/CP.1, 9/CP.2, 6/CP.3 and 33/CP.7 
71  Article 8.3 Kyoto Protocol. 
72  Decision 23/CP.7 and Decision 22/CMP.1 
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ultimate objective of the Convention will be taken into account in the review of 
demonstrable progress under Article 3.2 of the Protocol73. 
 
The National Communications and Reports on Demonstrable Progress, the In-depth review 
reports by Expert Review Teams, and the Synthesis Report of Reports Demonstrating 
Progress can clarify the role of the supplementarity requirement in practice, and how state 
parties and Kyoto institutions interpret the supplementarity requirement. These reports 
form therefore the foundation for the findings in the following sections.  
3.2 Implementation of the supplementarity requirement 
The supplementarity requirement requires that domestic actions constitute a significant 
element of the total effort of Annex I Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that 
use of the flexibility mechanisms be supplemental to domestic actions. In order to disclose 
the significance of those domestic actions, this section presents firstly the intensity and 
nature of domestic actions and secondly, the use of the flexibility mechanisms by each 
selected Party. 
3.2.1 Domestic policies and measures 
The strength of domestic actions can be revealed by their effect on each Partys greenhouse 
gas emission trends. Indeed, these trends often reflect the intensity and strength of domestic 
policies and measures intended to slow down or reverse emission trends. On the other 
hand, however, national circumstances such as population growth or changes in national 
gross domestic product also influence greenhouse gas emission trends. In general though, 
as presented in their national communications, national governments can significantly 
affect their emission trends by implementing strong domestic measures.   
 
Domestic efforts that in many cases began in the early 1990s have now begun to yield 
results by limiting growth in greenhouse gas emission trends74. Total aggregated 
greenhouse gas emissions of all reporting Annex I parties decreased by 6.4 per cent 
                                                
73  Decision 25/CP.8 and Yamin 2004, p. 361 
74  Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 9. 
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between the base year and 200375 and, with current policies and measures, emissions are 
projected to be 4.1 per cent below base year levels in 201076. Although this is an important 
development, none of the selected Annex I Parties are however projected to meet their 
individual Kyoto targets with current policies and measures. Consequently, besides current 
policies and measures, Parties are necessitated to implement additional measures. 
 
Indeed, even though current domestic policies and measures may be strong and effective, 
they do not make the Kyoto targets realizable.  Those Parties that may not meet their Kyoto 
targets with existing measures noted their determination to attain their targets and to take 
further action in the context of their existing national programmes, or to launch new 
measure and programmes.77 With additional policies and measures, total greenhouse gas 
emissions of reporting Annex I parties are projected to be about 9.6 per cent below base 
year levels in 2010. 
 
Additional measures are expected to bring emissions closer to the Kyoto targets in all 
Parties that envisage such measures. A few countries in particular, namely the European 
Community and Japan, projected a strong move towards achieving their individual Kyoto 
targets, with a considerably reduced distance to the target, through the implementation of 
additional measures. In the European Community emissions of greenhouse gases are 
projected to be 1.6 per cent below base year emissions in 2010 as a result of measures 
already under implementation. The implementation of additional proposed measures is 
projected to reduce EU-15 greenhouse gas emissions to 6.8 per cent below base year levels 
in 2010. The use of the Kyoto mechanisms brings the emissions to below 8 per cent, thus 
meeting the Kyoto targets.78 
 
                                                
75 Ibid, par. 56. 
76 Ibid, par.67 
77 Ibid,  par. 86. 
78 Fourth National Communication of the European Union. 
 40
Japan observed a reverse in trend from increasing emissions during the pre-Kyoto period 
towards decreasing emissions during the early action period, which could be explained in 
part by the implementation of effective policies and measures; significant progress has 
been made in reducing or at least stabilizing emissions in the very difficult to control sector 
of transport.79 More specifically, after a strong growth during the pre-Kyoto period (of 9.7 
per cent), greenhouse gas emissions in Japan have already decreased (by 1.5 per cent) 
between 1997 and 2003. This decrease is projected to continue and even accelerate until 
2010 (to -2.3 per cent) with current policies and measures.80 With additional measures 
based on its Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan, Japan projected an accelerated 
emission reduction by 8.7 per cent until 2010. 
 
Other Parties which achieved a limiting growth in greenhouse gas emissions are the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. These Parties observed a reverse in trend from increasing 
emissions during the pre-Kyoto period towards decreasing emissions during the early 
action period, which could also be explained by the implementation of effective policies 
and measures. The Netherlands has now succeeded in stabilizing emissions altogether. 
With additional measures in place, emissions in 2010 are projected to be only 0.9 per cent 
above the base year level instead of 13.6 per cent.81 
 
For Switzerland, the fact that emissions remained stable can be seen as the result of a 
combination of two factors: policies and measures influencing greenhouse gas emissions 
and weak economic development in the 1990s.82 The effect of measures already 
implemented are projected to bring the overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
between 1990 and 2010 to 3 per cent. In March 2005, the Swiss government decided to 
introduce additional measures in order to reach the goals of the Kyoto Protocol.83 These 
                                                
79 Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 9. 
80 Ibid, par. 70-73. 
81  Netherlands report on demonstrable progress, p.28. 
82 Switzerlands report on demonstrable progress, p. 24. 
83 Ibid,  p. 27. 
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additional measures are projected to reduce total greenhouse gas emissions with 6 per cent 
by 201084.  
 
There are, however also Parties which reported a significant increase in emissions. Norway 
reported an accelerated increase in emissions; from a 9 per cent increase between 1990 and 
2003 to a 23 per cent increase between 1990 and 2010 with current policies and measures 
in place85. Norway did not provide a with additional measures scenario in its fourth 
national communication in spite of a significant difference between their with measures 
scenario levels and the Kyoto target levels.86  
 
An other example is Canada, in which emissions are still growing significantly; in 2004 
Canadas emissions were 758 million ton, which is a 26.6 per cent increase over 1990 
emissions, and 34.6 per cent above the Kyoto target87. Canada states that this is because 
Canadas efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have been out-distanced by growth in 
its economy, energy exports and population since 1990.88 Canada notes that its domestic 
policies and measures have not achieved the level of reductions anticipated and reported in 
its third national communication of 2001. As a result, Canadas new government is 
developing and will implement a new suite of policies and measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions as part of its new environmental agenda.89  
                                                
84 Switzerlands report on demonstrable progress, p.28. 
85 Norways report on demonstrable progress, p. 12. 
86 Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 75. See paragraph 3.2.3.2 for an up-to-date presentation     
of Norways climate change policy. 
87 Canadas Report on Demonstrable Progress under the Kyoto Protocol, p.8. 
88 Ibid, p.11. 
89 Ibid. An in-depth review report on Canadas fourth national communication has not yet been published. See 
further 3.2.3.1. 
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Figure 1: Canada's GHG emission trend 
 
The supplementarity requirement requires that Annex I Parties implement domestic 
policies and measures as a significant part of the total effort undertaken by Parties to reach 
their targets, it does however not prescribe a specific result or decrease in emission trends. 
Moreover, Parties are free in their choice of domestic measures. They have been given the 
discretion as to decide which policies and measures may be most appropriate and effective 
within their states, depending on various national circumstances. Hence, for the purpose of 
this chapter it is insufficient to compare the various domestic policies and their results with 
each other. What should be assessed instead is the level of domestic efforts in comparison 
with the use of the flexibility mechanisms for each of the selected Parties, which elucidates 
the significance of their domestic efforts. 
3.2.2 Use of the flexibility mechanisms 
Almost all Parties are preparing to use the Kyoto mechanisms as part of their mitigation 
strategies. Use of the Kyoto mechanisms is seen as a tool to achieve the dual objective of 
delivering emission reductions at a lower cost compared with domestic measures and 
contributing to international cooperation on climate change mitigation. Many Parties, 
including the EU, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands, have advanced their efforts in 
preparing for the use of the Kyoto mechanisms. For these Parties, use of the Kyoto 
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mechanisms is expected to facilitate meeting the Kyoto targets90. As an illustration, savings 
from additional domestic measures being planned by the EU-15 would result in emission 
reductions of 6.8 per cent. The inclusion of Kyoto mechanisms will lower projected 
emissions in 2010 to 9.3 per cent below base year levels91. Japan will fall short of 
achieving its Kyoto Protocol commitment by 1.6 per cent of the total volume of the base 
year. Japan reports that it will be necessary to make up this difference by utilizing the 
Kyoto mechanisms while respecting the general rule that the Kyoto mechanisms are 
supplementary to domestic measures92. 
 
Currently, Parties are at different stages of preparation for the use of flexibility mechanisms 
in meeting their Kyoto targets. A few Parties expect to use such credits to meet a 
considerable part of their emission reduction commitments, and these countries are at an 
advanced stage of implementation, for instance the Netherlands and Japan.93 In the 
Netherlands, the target for government use of the Kyoto mechanisms is 100 million tonnes 
CO2 equivalents over the 2008-2012 commitment period. By 2005, this target was already 
entirely covered by either framework agreements with intermediary organisations, 
participation in funds, of project contracts. Institutional and financial arrangements have 
also been made. The Netherlands was in fact a first-mover on the market for emission 
reduction based on the Kyoto mechanisms.94    
 
For other countries, such as Norway, the details of how exactly the Kyoto mechanisms will 
be used in the period 2008-2012 had not yet been decided at 1 January 2006. Norway 
reported that the details will depend on how the link to the European Unions emissions 
trading scheme will be established95. For Norway cost-effectiveness has been the point of 
departure both for formulating the present climate change policy and for designing and 
                                                
90  Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 91. 
91  EU Report on demonstrable progress, p. 5. 
92  Japans Fourth National Communication, p.134. 
93  Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 43. 
94  Netherlands report on demonstrable progress, p. 18-20. 
95  For the result, see par. 3.2.4.2. and 3.2.4.3. 
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implementing policies and measures that will ensure compliance with the quantitative 
commitments of the Kyoto Protocol. According to projections, Norway faces a gap to be 
covered through further national measures or through the use of the flexibility mechanisms 
of about 10 million tonnes annually, or about 50 million tonnes for the period 2008-201296. 
Although the introduction of further domestic measures would reduce the need to acquire 
Kyoto units, the Expert Review Team noted that, since the marginal costs of domestic 
action is generally higher than the current international price of CO2, this advocacy would 
favour the acquisition of Kyoto units97. 
 
More exceptionally is Canadas national communication, in which Canada reports that it 
does not intend to make use of the flexibility mechanisms, even though Canada faces a 
significant gap to its Kyoto target98.  
3.2.3  Significance of domestic action in proportion to use of the flexibility 
mechanisms 
Many Parties stress their commitment to ensure that domestic policies and measures, 
including activities aimed at enhancing removals by sinks, comprise a significant part of 
their overall effort to meet the Kyoto target. Practically all Parties that intend to acquire 
Kyoto units expect also to have domestic policies contributing significantly to the overall 
effort to attain the Kyoto target.99 Japan, for instance, expects that according to its recent 
with measures projections the difference between projected emission levels and the Kyoto 
target will be 12 per cent. It expects additional measures to bring the emissions down by 
6.5 per cent. LULUCF activities will contribute another 3.9 per cent and the remaining 1.6 
per cent be covered by acquisitions of Kyoto units. Altogether, Japan expects that domestic 
policies and measures, including LULUCF activities, will contribute up to 86 per cent of its 
effort to attain its Kyoto target, which constitutes a significant element of this effort100. 
                                                
96 Norways report on demonstrable progress under the Kyoto Protocol, p. 8 and 16 
97 Report of the centralized in-depth review of the fourth national communication of Norway, par. 60. 
98 Canadas fourth report on climate change, p. 66. See further par. 3.2.4.1. 
99 Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 94 
100  Japans Fourth national communication p.134 and Japans Report indicating demonstrable progress p. 4. 
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The Netherlands expects that the difference between with measures projections in 2010 
and the Kyoto target will be around 20 Mt CO2 eq. or around 10 per cent of the base year 
level. It expects to bring emissions down by another 2.5 per cent resulting from additional 
measures. The government of the Netherlands has already allocated financial resources to 
acquire around 20 Mt CO2 eq. Kyoto credits per year through joint implementation or 
CDM projects101, which will more than compensate for the remaining difference to the 
Kyoto target.102  
 
An other example is Switzerland which estimates its overall emission reduction 
commitment at 4.2 Mt CO2 eq. annually for the first commitment period. It then envisages 
more than half of this reduction, or a minimum of 2.2 Mt to be covered by domestic 
measures, 1.6 Mt maximum to be covered by acquisition of Kyoto units and 0.4 Mt to 
come from additional acquisition of Kyoto units by companies in complying with the 
national CO2 emissions regulations.103 
 
The Secretariat summarizes in its Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress in 
accordance with article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol that the national reports by Parties show 
that, taking into account both, the effect of implemented and additional measures, the 
overall effect stemming from domestic measures is projected to outweigh the effect of 
expected acquisition of Kyoto units in the overall effort to meet the Kyoto target.104 In fact, 
none of the national communications have been criticized on grounds of inconformity with 
the supplementarity requirement. 
                                                
101 Besides this purchase, operators in the Netherlands can acquire up to 8.6 Mt CO2-equivalents though use 
of  the EU ETS. See further par. 3.2.4.3. 
102  Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 95 
103  Ibid, par. 96 
104  Ibid, par. 97. 
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3.2.4 Considerations 
Almost all Parties are preparing for the use of the Kyoto mechanisms as part of their 
mitigation strategies. The relevant legislative arrangements are being put in place to make 
the Kyoto mechanisms operational. In all cases use of the Kyoto mechanisms is seen as a 
tool to achieve the dual objective of delivering emission reductions at a lower cost 
compared with domestic measures and contributing to international cooperation on climate 
change mitigation.105  
 
In addition, Parties have already implemented a considerable number of domestic measures 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Parties expect the magnitude of the impact of 
these implemented policies and measures to increase. Most Parties have also in place plans 
for additional policies and measures that could help reduce the difference between their 
projected emission levels for the first commitment period and their Kyoto targets. Parties 
estimated the potential impacts of their domestic policies and measures and of their use of 
the Kyoto mechanisms and, based on these estimates, the Secretariat noted that, taking into 
account all the data reported, Parties domestic policies and measures are expected to form a 
significant part of the overall effort to achieve the Kyoto target.106 
 
In general, Annex I Parties climate change policies are considered to be in line with the 
supplementarity requirement and none of the National Communications have been 
criticized on the grounds of incompliance with the supplementarity requirement. More 
specifically, however, the significance of domestic actions in relation to the use of the 
flexibility mechanisms varies among the Annex I Parties, and the ratio domestic actions 
and use of the flexibility mechanisms differs from Party to Party.107 
 
Questionable is whether any thorough conclusions on the implementation of the 
supplementarity requirement can be drawn from the National Communications, In-Depth 
                                                
105  Ibid,  par 140 
106  Ibid,  par. 147. 
107   See table on p. 62. 
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Review Reports and Reports on Demonstrable Progress. An important reason for this is the 
nature of the reporting system. Incompliance or incomprehensive compliance with 
reporting obligations does hardly ever lead to binding consequences.108 Although all 
selected Parties have complied with their obligation to report, the quality of the reports vary 
significantly. While most selected Parties, such as the European Union, the Netherlands109, 
Japan, and Switzerland reported extensively on their implemented domestic policies and 
measures, other Parties were less specific.  
 
Canada, for instance, reported that its emissions are forecasted to increase by about 1.5% 
annually between 2004 and 2010, to reach 828 Mt by 2010 and almost 897 Mt by 2020110. 
However, Canada did not report specific domestic measures which slow down or reverse 
the greenhouse gas emission trend. Moreover, both its national communication and report 
on demonstrable progress lack an overview of with measures projection and with 
additional measures projection. The Expert Review Team has not yet published its report 
of the centralized in-depth review of the fourth national communication of Canada, and it is 
questionable how the Expert Review Team reviews this Canadian National 
Communication. 
 
A different example is Norway. This Party did not provide a concise presentation of its 
policies and measures111 and how it intends to cover the gap between 2010 projected 
emissions and the Kyoto target. In fact, according to projections, the total greenhouse gas 
emissions per year will be about 10 million tonnes higher than Norways commitment 
                                                
108  Sands 2004, p.376. Article 18 Kyoto Protocol provides that any procedures and mechanisms under this 
Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. 
109 The National Climate Policy Implementation Plan outlines how the Netherlands intends to meet its 
emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 
110 Canadas fourth national communication, p.148. 
111 Report of the centralized in-depth review of the fourth national communication of Norway, p. 5. The 
Expert Review Team recommended that Norway provides this information in its next national 
communication. 
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under the Kyoto Protocol. At the time of delivery of its fourth national communication 
details for the period of 2008-2012 had not yet been decided112. 
 
Thus while some reports are very comprehensive and detailed, others lack specifics or 
contain incomplete information. Moreover, as the latest reports were due January 2006, this 
chapter requires the inclusion of more in-depth and more up-to-date information on several 
Parties climate change policies and their intended use of the flexibility mechanisms. The 
next sections focus on Norway and Canada as these countries provided the least detailed 
reports. The findings in the sections are not based upon the information reported to the 
Compliance Committee of the UNFCCC, but instead on official national governmental 
climate change plans. Finally, the climate policy of the European Union will be discussed 
in more depth. In this context, the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the 
Linking Directive will be considered.   
3.2.4.1 Canadas Climate Change Policy 
Canada is committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 6 per cent below 1990 
levels, which, in 2002, implied a reduction of 240 Mt from their projected business-as- 
usual emissions level in 2010. Canadas Climate Change Plan 2002 contained three steps 
to achieving this target. Step I included actions already underway, which were expected to 
reduce emissions by 80 MT. Of these actions, a reduction of 2 MT would be achieved 
through cooperation on the international market. Step II involved further measures, which 
were expected to reduce emissions by a further 100 MT. Of these additional measures, a 
minimal reduction of 10 MT would be achieved through government purchases of permits 
in the international market. Step III will address the remaining 60 MT.113 In this scenario, 
the ratio domestic efforts / use of the flexibility mechanisms would be 168/12, i.e. 14/1.114 
This shows that domestic efforts would constitute a significant element. Unfortunately, 
the targets and projections in this Plan were unattainable to the Government of Canada. The 
                                                
112 In June 2007, however, the Norwegian government presented its new paper on climate change policy. 
containing proposals for concrete new measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See further par.3.2.3.2. 
113 Government of Canada 2002,  Climate Change Plan for Canada  
114 These numbers are based on the data available in 2002. See note 103. 
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gap between its Kyoto target and its 2010 emission projection extended from 240 MT to 
270 Mt.  
 
In 2005, the Government released its revised Implementation Plan to the Climate Change 
Plan: Moving Forward on Climate Change: A Plan for Honouring our Kyoto 
Commitment. The Plan intended to close the gap of 270 MT greenhouse gas emissions, 
and contained a number of important elements among which the Climate Fund. Through 
the new Climate Fund, the government intended to purchase 75-115 Mt of reduction credits 
a year, up to 40 percent of the total reduction needed in 2008-2012. Priority would be given 
to domestic reductions from farmers, forestry companies, municipalities, and other sources. 
Reductions would also be purchased through the Kyoto mechanisms to help Canada 
comply with its Kyoto target. The Plan contains however very few specifics on this Fund, 
particularly in what types of projects and reductions will be funded, whether the overall 
target is possible, where emission reductions will come from or whether sufficient money 
has been allocated. Clearly some international credits will be purchased through the Kyoto 
Protocol CDM/JI provisions, but the ratio between domestic actions and use of the 
flexibility mechanisms cannot be elucidated from this Implementation Plan.115  
 
In April 2007 Environment Minister John Baird announced a new climate plan for Canada, 
entitled Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air 
Pollution. Under this plan, Canada would reduce greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent by 
2020. However, that would be a 20 percent reduction from 2006 levels. In this scenario 
Canada will not reach its 2012 Kyoto commitments until at least 2023.116 With regard to 
flexibility mechanisms, the Plan allows Canadian companies access to the Clean 
Development Mechanism up to 10% of each firms total target. The Plan does not specify 
the amount of reductions which would be achieved through governmental participation in 
the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
                                                
115 David Suzuki foundation 2005. 
116 Government of Canada 2007. 
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Canada is committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 6 per cent below 1990 
levels. However, the countrys emissions are now 30 percent above 1990 levels.117 As 
Canada is far from compliance with its Kyoto reduction target, the Canadian government 
may be necessitated to purchase a considerable amount of credits on the international 
market. It is yet uncertain how the Compliance Committee of the UNFCCC will act in such 
a situation. 
3.2.4.2 Norways Climate Change Policy 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Norway has a commitment to maintain its greenhouse gas 
emissions at a level of maximum 1 per cent above its 1990 level, which means an emission 
level of 50.6 million tonnes. Although Norway reported in its fourth national 
communication that after the implementation of domestic mitigation measures Norway 
would still face a gap to its Kyoto target of about 10 million tonnes annually118, the 
Norwegian Government presented its 2007 White Paper on Climate Change that it aims to 
improve on Norways commitment under the Kyoto Protocol by 10 per cent.119 This 
implies that Norway has to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 9 per cent compared 
with its 1990 level, an emissions level of about 45 million tonnes of CO2-equivalents. 
According to the projections of the Government presented in its National Budget 2008, 
Norway would have a greenhouse gas emissions level of 58 million tons in 2010.120 This is 
about 8 million tons above its Kyoto target and 13 million tons above its White Paper 
target. 
 
In fact, the amount of 8 million tons could have been much higher if Norway had not 
undertaken any domestic actions since 1990. Indeed, between 1990 and 2004 Norway has 
implemented various measures with a total reduction effect of about 11 million tons of 
                                                
117 Canadas Fourth National Communication  
118 Norways report on demonstrable progress under the Kyoto Protocol, p. 8 and 16 
119 Norwegian Ministry of Environment 2006-2007. 
120 Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2007-2008. This 2010 projection differs from the projection presented in 
Norways fourth national communication, in which Norway presented its 2010 projection as if Norway had 
not undertaken any early actions at all, such as the introduction of the 1991 CO2-Tax. 
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CO2-equivalents. Among these measures were a CO2-tax, a requirement to collect landfill 
gas, tax and recycling schemes on HFC, and a climate change agreement with the 
aluminium industry.121  The implementation of these measures caused the 2010 projection 
to be at 58 million tons instead of 69 million tons greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The gap of 8 million tons could be closed either by further national reduction measures or 
by the governmental purchase of emission allowances. As to the first option, the 
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority presented in 2007 a report on mitigation options to 
meet the goals described in the Governments White Paper. In total, the new technical 
mitigation options could by 2020 have an emission reduction potential of 22 percent 
compared to the emissions in 1990122. The reduction options are within CO2 capture and 
storage, road traffic, emissions from buildings, oil and gas extraction, offshore electricity 
supply, industrial installations, emissions from agriculture, the waste sector, and finally 
mitigation options and technological development for ships.123 These reduction options are 
under consideration as measures to meet a greenhouse gas emission reduction of 30 per 
cent below 1990 levels by 2020, which is also an aim described in the Governments White 
Paper. 
 
These mitigation options might enable Norway to meet its White Papers aims, however 
they do not contribute to the achievement of the Kyoto target, as the first Kyoto 
commitment period has already begun. Instead, this Kyoto target will be achieved by use of 
flexibility mechanisms. To meet the Kyoto target of 50,6 million tons, the Ministry of 
Finance describes in its 2008 National Budget that the Government needs to buy emission 
allowances covering 6 million tons of greenhouse gas emission annually. The remaining 2 
million tons will be achieved mainly through the absorption of carbon by trees. Forests will 
thus act as carbon sinks. New mitigation measures to reduce emissions in Norway will 
                                                
121 See further, Norways Fourth national communication, p.53. 
122 Norwegian Pollution Control Authority 2007. 
123 Ibid. 
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only have a very small contribution.124  Moreover, to meet the aim of the 10 per cent over-
fulfilment, additional emission allowances have to be bought equivalent to 5 million tons of 
greenhouse gas emissions. In total, for the period 2008-2012 the Government acquires 
emission allowances equivalent to 11 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions annually125.   
 
Thus, Norway intends to meet its Kyoto target and its White Paper target broadly through a 
combination of the effect of early implemented domestic measures and by paying for 
emission reductions in other countries, especially developing countries.126 The following 
figure shows expected greenhouse gas emissions for Norway between 1990 and 2010 
without the implementation of mitigation measures compared with the effect of 
implemented measures and the use of flexibility mechanisms. The light blue area represents 
the emission reductions achieved through early actions implemented since 1990. The 
yellow area shows the amount of emission allowances bought through the flexibility 
mechanisms. The black line shows Norways emissions without any use of the flexibility 
mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
 
                                                
124 Kallbekken 2008. 
125 Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2007-2008, St. prp. nr 1 re kap. 1638 Kjøp av klimakvoter. 
126 Norwegian Parliament 2007, Klimaforliket i Stortinget, Innst. S. nr. 145 (2007-2008) 
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Source: Steffen Kallbekken, CICERO Center for international climate and environmental research, Klima 1-
2008, Slik skal Norge oppfylle klimamålene. Available in Norwegian at 
<http://www.cicero.uio.no/fulltext/index.aspx?id=5898> 
 
The ratio domestic actions / use of flexibility mechanisms for the achievement of the White 
Paper 2010 greenhouse gas emissions target of 45 million tons annually is 11/11. For the 
achievement of the Norwegian Kyoto target, the ratio is 11/6. On 26 October 2007 Norway 
officially joined the EU ETS127, which allows Norwegian operators to use credits from the 
project-based mechanisms up to equivalence of 3 MtCO2.128 In order to meet the Kyoto 
target, Norway could now use  allowances from the project mechanisms up to 9 Mt CO2. 6 
Mt Co2 through governmental purchase and 3 MtCO2 through operators.129 This raises the 
ratio domestic actions versus use of the flexibility mechanisms to 11/9, i.e. 1.2/1 Mt CO2.  
 
Although this ratio indicates that the Kyoto target is achieved mainly through domestic 
actions, all domestic measures were already in effect before 2003. Instead of closing the 
gap to the Kyoto target by a combination of additional domestic measures and use of the 
flexibility measures, as most Kyoto Parties reported to intend, Norway intends to acquire a 
considerable amount of emission reduction units from other countries.130 It is questionable 
whether this is in line with the supplementarity requirement.    
 
In fact, the Kyoto Protocol only regulates climate action for the first commitment period 
from 2008-2012 and compares Parties efforts with their base year levels. The Kyoto 
Protocol does not, however, specify any quantification of the emissions level between the 
base year 1990 and the commitment period. In assessing actions of Annex I Parties, 
                                                
127 Norways Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St.prp. nr. 26 (2007-2008). 
128 See further par. 3.2.4.3. 
129 Government of Norway,  Norwegian National Allocation Plan for the emissions trading system in 2008-
2012. 
130 See also the website Carbon Neutral Norway at which the Ministry of Finance describes its policies and 
measures to over-fulfil its Kyoto commitment by 10 per cent, to reduce emissions with 30 per cent by 2020 
and to become carbon neutral in 2030. These targets will mainly be reached by the purchase of Certified 
Emission Reductions from CDM projects.  
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specific actions between 1990 and the commitment period are thus not taken into account. 
However, policies and measures that were implemented or adopted since 1990 may have an 
effect on the total emissions level during the first commitment, as in the case of Norway. 
 
 
Source: <http://www.cseindia.org/programme/geg/briefing_kyoto2.htm>. 
 
To memorize, domestic actions shall constitute a significant element in Parties policies to 
meet their Kyoto reduction targets. In order to comply with this supplementarity 
requirement, it seems reasonable to argue that it is not of importance when those domestic 
measures came into effect, as long as they are still in effect at the time the government 
makes use of the flexibility mechanisms. Under the Kyoto commitment period from 2008  
2012, those domestic measures still need to be effective, which means that they should 
result in an amount of greenhouse gas emission reductions outweighing the reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from use of the flexibility mechanisms by Norway. If 
this can be demonstrated, Norway would presumably be in compliance with the 
supplementarity requirement.  
 
On the other hand however, it would be unsustainable and against the ultimate objective of 
the Framework Convention if a Kyoto Party does not exploit its domestic reduction 
capabilities, and instead of implementing available additional reduction measures at home 
uses flexibility mechanisms to comply with its Kyoto target. A policy more in line with the 
principles of the Framework Convention, such as the principles of sustainable development 
and common but differentiated responsibilities, would be to meet the Kyoto target partly by 
additional domestic reduction measures and partly by using flexibility mechanisms.   
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3.2.4.3 The European Climate Change Policy 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has a reduction commitment of 8 per cent relative to 
their 1990 level, which means a Kyoto target of approximately 3936 million tons of CO2 
equivalents. To meet this reduction target, the European Climate Change Programme 
(ECCP) was established in June 2000 to help identify the most environmentally and cost-
effective additional measures to meet the Kyoto target. The policies and measures under 
the ECCP complement those of the Member States. The programme investigated more than 
40 measures in total using selection criteria such as cost effectiveness and time frames. A 
package of a number of measures in the energy, transport and industry sector was identified 
to be implemented with priority.131  
 
An important component of the European climate strategy to reach its Kyoto target is the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The ETS was established by Directive 
2003/87/EC. Under the ETS, operators receive emission allowances from their government 
which have to be surrendered at the end of each year, equal to their emissions in that year. 
Operators holding more allowances than verified emissions may sell unneeded allowances 
to other operators in the EU in need of more allowances, or keep them for future years. 
While international emissions trading is a mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol directed at 
Annex I parties and takes place between governments, the ETS is directed at operators of 
certain installations in the EU. It is an EU measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
trading takes place between private entities.  
 
Besides trading emission allowances within the trading scheme, a linking between the ETS 
and the two flexible project mechanisms, clean development mechanism and joint 
implementation has been established132. This allows European operators covered by the 
ETS to carry out emission-reducing projects in other Annex I countries (JI) and non-Annex 
I countries (CDM) and to convert the credits earned into emission allowances under the 
ETS. The linking Directive thus allows operators to buy credits from joint implementation 
                                                
131 Commission of the European Communities 2001. 
132 Directive 2004/101/EC. 
 56
(JI) or clean development mechanism (CDM) projects and bring them into the EU ETS to 
fulfil their obligations. 
 
The CDM and JI can be used by operators covered by the ETS as well as by those 
governments, which have set domestic targets not sufficient to meet the emissions limits of 
the European Burden Sharing Agreement in the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU ETS is estimated 
to contribute by at least approximately 150 Mt CO 2 to the reduction of EU 15 greenhouse 
gas emissions, which is equivalent to 3.4 % of EU‑15 base-year emissions.133 Linking 
Kyoto flexibility mechanisms to the emissions trading scheme has a further reduction 
potential of 187.5 Mt CO2.134 
 
The EU Commissions has not set a limit to the usage of Kyoto units resulting from 
emissions trading by EU operators, because this is regarded as a domestic measure. With 
regard to the usage of credits resulting from CDM and JI projects by operators, however, 
governments are required to consider the supplementarity requirement and are required to 
restrict the use of them by operators. As part of the second National Allocation Plans135 
covering the Kyoto commitment period, Member States had to include a limit on the 
maximum use of project-based credits by operators.136 For most EU member states, the 
limit for use of the CDM/JI by EU-ETS operators, approved by the EU Commission, is 
10% of their EU-ETS cap. For the Netherlands, this means a limit of 8.6 Mt. Besides the 20 
Mt CO2/year through governmental use of the flexibility mechanisms, EU-ETS operators 
                                                
133 European Environment Agency 2007, p.53. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Under the EU ETS Directive, Member States prepare national allocation plans (NAP) for each trading 
period which have to be accepted by the European Commission. The allocation plans include the total 
quantity of allowances which will be available during a trading period along with the rules for allocating 
these allowances to operators, amongst others. For the first trading period from 2005-2007, the final NAPs for 
all of the EU countries are since June 2005 accepted by the European Commission and made public. The 
NAPs as well as some government programs contain information on the planned government purchase of 
CDM and JI credits.  
136 Directive 2004/101/EC (5) 
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can use CDM and JI to acquire emission allowances up to 8.6 MT a year. For Italy, with a 
limit at 15 per cent of their EU-ETS cap, this means a limit of 29.3 Mt CO2/year. This 
amount is apart from the 19 Mt Co2 equivalents acquired through governmental use of the 
flexibility mechanisms.137 For the EU-15 in total, the limit is 14.5 per cent of the EU ETS 
cap138.  In the EU-15, the allowed use of JI and CDM by operators is approximately 2.6 
times higher than the intended use of Kyoto Mechanisms by EU Member States, which 
amounts to 107.5 Mt CO 2‑equivalents.139 
 
Although the EU ETS is a domestic EU measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
EU, use of the flexibility mechanisms Joint Implementation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism by operators does in fact increase a countrys use of the flexibility 
mechanisms. Even though EU Kyoto Parties only report on their governmental purchases 
of emission allowances140, those Parties are also responsible for purchases of emission 
allowances by operators subject to their jurisdiction. Adding the purchases of operators to 
the governmental purchases, this considerably changes the ratio domestic actions versus 
use of the flexibility mechanisms.  
 
As an illustration, if operators purchase allowances up to the limit, the EU 15-countries 
would acquires around 387 MtCO2 through CDM and JI projects, this is inclusive 107.5 
MtCO2 acquired through governmental purchases.141 Italy could in total acquire 48 Mt 
CO2 and the Netherlands 28.6 Mt CO2. As purchases by operators can significantly 
increase use of flexibility mechanisms by an EU Kyoto Party, this raises questions as to a 
countrys compliance with the supplementarity requirement. The domestic actions of such 
a Party still have to constitute a significant element of the total efforts to meet Kyoto 
                                                
137 European Environment Agency 2007, p.54. 
138 Commission of the European Communities 2007. 
139 European Environment Agency 2007.  
140 See the National Communications of members of the European Union.. 
141 Klepper and Peterson 2006. 
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targets and these actions have to outweigh the combined effect of governmental purchases 
and purchases by operators. 
 
The EU Commission contemplated the use of project-based mechanisms by EU 
governments and operators in its 2008 Climate Package, and expressed concern that too 
generous a use of CDMs can dilute the effectiveness of the ETS [] and reducing the 
incentive for governments and companies to promote emission reductions at home. 
Under the new ETS, companies will still have access to CDMs, but the use of credits 
generated by such mechanisms will be limited to the levels used in the current ETS 
period.142 There is thus no intention by the EU Commission to alter the limit on the 
maximum use of project-based credits by operators in the future. 
 
According to Article 25 of EC Directive 2003/87/ec, the EU ETS can be linked with 
compatible emission trading schemes in other Annex B countries that have ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol.143 Norway wished to be linked to the EU ETS on 1 January 2008, however 
it wished for an exception from the restriction on the purchase of CDM and JI allowances. 
The CDM/JI cap for EU ETS operators varies from 8 per cent to 20 per cent, while the 
limit is set at 10 per cent for most Parties.144 Norway did however not wish such a 
restriction.145  
 
On 26 October 2007, the European Commission announced that it had come to an 
agreement with the countries in the European Economic Area on linking their respective 
Emissions Trading systems with the EU ETS. In line with EU legislation and practice146, a 
cap is set on the number of credits from the Kyoto Protocols project-based mechanisms 
that operators may use. The cap for Norway is 20% of the total quantity of allowances. 
Norwegian companies will thus be among the companies in Europe that have the most 
                                                
142 Commission of the European Communities 2008. 
143 EU national communication p. 47-50 
144 European Environment Agency 2007, p.54 
145 http://www.dn.no/forsiden/politikkSamfunn/article1122265.ece?WT.svl=article_title 
146 Directive 2004/101/EC (5). 
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opportunity to use JI/CDM allowances.147 In order to meet the Kyoto target, Norway could 
use allowances from the project mechanisms up to 9 Mt CO2. 6 Mt Co2 through 
governmental purchase and 3 MtCO2 through operators.148 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to clarify the phrase that domestic actions shall constitute a significant 
element, through an assessment of  the implementation of the supplementarity requirement 
and of the specific review and reporting requirements within the European Union and 
several Umbrella countries. The chapter demonstrated how the selected Parties have 
reported on their implemented and planned domestic policies and measures, their 
(intended) use of the flexibility mechanisms, and on the significance of domestic actions in 
comparison with use of the flexibility mechanisms.  
 
The Secretariat summarizes in its Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress in 
accordance with article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol that the national reports by Parties show 
that, taking into account both, the effect of implemented and additional measures, the 
overall effect stemming from domestic measures is projected to outweigh the effect of 
expected acquisition of Kyoto units in the overall effort to meet the Kyoto target.149 In 
general, Parties domestic policies and measures are thus expected to form a significant part 
of the overall effort to achieve the Kyoto target150. Since the expert review teams have not 
questioned or criticised any of the domestic policies in the light of the supplementarity 
requirement and the Secretariat has only drawn general conclusions, it is difficult to 
provide a more specific interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in the Kyoto 
target. State practice seems not to have established an agreement of the Parties regarding 
the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in the light of Article 31.3.b Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
                                                
147 Office of the Prime Minister 2007.  
148 Government of Norway,  Norwegian National Allocation Plan for the emissions trading system in 2008-
2012. 
149  Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress, par. 97. 
150 Synthesis of reports demonstrating progress,  par. 147 
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Due to the varying quality of National Communications, no objective general conclusions 
can be drawn on the implementation of the supplementarity requirement. Factual use of 
flexibility mechanisms by certain Parties could become much higher than reported in their 
communications. One reason for this is that certain Parties, for instance Canada, still have 
to implement effective national measures capable of bringing the Party considerably closer 
to its Kyoto target. As long as such measures are not in effect, there exists the risk that the 
Party needs to use flexibility mechanisms to a large extent to comply with the Kyoto 
reduction commitments. A different reason is related to the EU ETS and its Linking 
Directive. Operators in countries subject to the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, and since 
October 2007 also in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, are allowed to make use of the 
CDM and JI up to a specific percentage of their total allowances. These purchases need to 
be added to the governmental purchases of a Party, as this will reflect more objectively the 
use of flexibility mechanisms by these countries.  
  
The following table gives an overview of the implementation of the supplementarity 
requirement by showing the ratio between domestic efforts and use of the Kyoto 
mechanisms for the selected countries151. Total domestic effort is calculated as the 
difference between the 2010 without measures projections and the 2010 with additional 
measures projections. The ensuing number gives an indication of the total reduction of 
millions of CO2 equivalent reductions compared with a business-as-usual projection. 
Unfortunately, only a small number of parties have provided a without measures scenario. 
The numbers between parentheses indicate that the number is inferred of the graphs 
provided in the Reports of in-depth reviews.  
  
For Japan, the numbers are in accordance with the information provided in their National 
Communications and Reports on Demonstrable Progress. For Canada and Norway, national 
governmental documents have been the main source for the numbers. For all Parties falling 
                                                
151   In addition, Italys ratio is included because Italy allocates 1,150 million of its budget for preparations   
       of use of the flexibility mechanisms, which is more than any other EU member state. 
 61
under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, not only their own National Communications, 
but also the 2007 Report on Greenhouse gas emission trends and projections in Europe, 
by the European Environment Agency was an important source for the findings in the table.  
  
The purpose of the table is to elucidate the ratio domestic efforts and use of the flexibility 
mechanisms by a number of Parties. Although the table shows in general that more than 
fifty per cent of the Kyoto reduction target is achieved through domestic actions, the exact 
numbers might differ from those in the table. This is due to the fact that Parties are not 
always consistent on the exact numbers presented in their reports and documents, and 
secondly, the business-as-usual projections are often uncertain and subject to adaptation. In 
general though, currently most Parties implement the supplementarity requirement by 
complying with their Kyoto reduction commitments mainly through domestic actions. 1 Mt 
of greenhouse gas emissions reduced through use of the flexibility mechanisms is 
compensated by a reduction of more than 1 Mt CO2 equivalents achieved through domestic 
action. 
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Norway  Netherl.    Switzerl.  EU15  Japan    Can. Italy  
Kyoto 
target or 
EU B.S 
target 
  50.2       202      49   3936   1163 563  486 
Base year 
level 
  49.8      215      53   4278   1237 599 520 
2010 
without 
measures 
  
  69 
      
      284 
 
        
    [54]     [4620] 
 
   
   [1400] 
 
828 
  
 [609] 
2010 with 
measures 
 
  58 
 
     215 
           
    51 
 
  4106 
 
       
1311 
         
828 
 
  592 
2010 with 
additional 
measures 
 
  58 
 
     209 
           
    50 
 
  3940 
          
1231 
         
 Na 
 
  524 
Total 
domestic 
effort 
        
   11 
 
     75 
 
    4.2 
    
   680 
           
170 
         
 Na 
   
 85 
Remaining 
gap 
   8       7.5     1.2     4     67  Na 39 
  Use of    
  flex.  mech.    
      
   6         20      2       108  20  Na 
               
19 
Ratio 
domestic 
effort / use 
of Kyo.me. 
   11/6 
  1.8/ 1  
 
Incl..L.D.: 
   11/9 
   1.2/1 
 
74.8/20 
3.74/1 
 
Incl. L.D: 
74.8/28.6 
2.6/1 
  
[4.2/1.6] 
   2.6/1 
 
 
   680/108 
     6.3/1 
 
 Incl. L.D.: 
 620/387.5 
     1.8/1 
 [170/20] 
   8.5/1 
 
 
Na 
 
 
[84.7/19] 
4.5/1 
 
Incl. L.D: 
84.7/48.5 
1.7/1 
 
Na = not available 
A with measures projection encompass currently implemented and adopted policies and measures.  
A with additional measures projection also encompasses planned policies and measures.  
A without measures projection excludes all policies and measures implemented, adopted or planned after 
the year chosen as the starting point for this projection. 
 63
 
4  The Assessment of the Supplementarity Requirement 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters covered the interpretation of the supplementarity requirement in 
accordance with the Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
These chapters did however not put forward a workable interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement. This chapter aims to provide an interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement in accordance with the principle of effective interpretation, 
which requires an interpretation which is effective and useful.152 
 
With a view to a future climate regime, the most relevant and interesting assessment 
concerns the question of how the supplementarity requirement should be interpreted and 
how the requirement should be applied and implemented. No doubt, global greenhouse gas 
emissions are rising significantly153 and although Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
might succeed in meeting their Kyoto reduction commitments, this 5.2 per cent reduction 
target is clearly insufficient to tackle climate change effectively. Indeed, an effective future 
climate regime requires much more significant reduction commitments. Secondly, as 
developing countries greenhouse gas emissions are rising considerably, the climate regime 
requires global participation. On this background, this final chapter provides an 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement for the Articles 6, 12 and 17 which could 
contribute to the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime by both enabling Kyoto 
                                                
152 Whether or not such an interpretation is supported by the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties is 
subject to debate among scholars. While, for instance Cassesse argues that the Vienna Convention supports 
this principle for treaty interpretation (Cassesse 2005, p. 178), other scholars argue the opposite. This 
discussion however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. For an in-depth discussion, see Voigt 2007, p. 405-
410.  
153 IPCC 2007: Summary for Policymakers.  
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Parties to meet more stringent reduction targets and on getting developing countries on 
board of a future climate regime.   
 
In the first section, the cost-effectiveness argument behind the flexibility mechanisms is 
explained, as cost-effectiveness enables Parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a 
larger extent. The cost-effectiveness argument is used to argue in favour of use of 
flexibility mechanisms and against a stringent interpretation of the supplementarity 
requirement. Not only the economic benefits of use of the flexibility mechanisms are 
described , but also the factors which can partly reduce cost-effectiveness among which the 
supplementarity requirement. 
  
The second section presents the arguments in favour of the supplementarity requirement. 
First of all, it is argued that greenhouse gas emissions have to be reduced particularly 
within the industrialized world in order to tackle the climate change problem in the long 
term and to ensure the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime. Other arguments 
are the stimulation of technological development in industrialized countries; the role model 
of Annex I Parties; the sustainability of a future climate regime, including the problem of 
hot air; and most importantly, equity considerations.  
 
The final section assesses the importance of a balance between cost-effectiveness, 
environmental effectiveness, and equity considerations for a future climate change regime. 
As a sustainable climate regime requires the integration of those concepts, the 
supplementarity requirement should be interpreted on that background. 
4.2   The Cost-effectiveness of the Flexibility Mechanisms  
 The reason behind the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol is connected to the 
cost-efficiency concept in economics; use of flexibility mechanisms in a competitive 
market would give a cost-effective outcome, as the agreed emission reduction target could 
be attained in the cheapest way possible.154  This section clarifies the cost-effectiveness of 
                                                
154 Westskog 2001, p.5 
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the flexibility mechanisms in more depth while also presenting three factors that can reduce 
this cost-effectiveness. 
 
The cost-effectiveness of Kyoto flexibility mechanisms relies on the significant difference 
in marginal abatement costs between countries and between sectors155. As the marginal 
costs of greenhouse gas emission reductions, which are the costs related to reducing 
emissions by an additional unit of greenhouse gases156, vary greatly among the Kyoto 
Parties157, several studies have pointed out the scope for costs savings by an efficient 
distribution of abatement costs across countries158. If Parties could make optimal use of 
these marginal cost differences, it is argued that the overall costs of combating climate 
change could be reduced by almost 80 per cent compared with domestic action only159.  
 
Cost-effectiveness requires that the marginal abatement costs are equalized across 
countries, or in other words, that the costs of reducing climate emissions with one more 
unit in one country is equal to the cost of reducing climate emissions with one more unit in 
another country.160 In a competitive tradable market for emission allowances, a cost-
effective situation is achieved since the price of a quota is the same for every country, and 
marginal costs can hence be equalized across countries. 161  
                                                
155 Pan 2001, par. 2.7 
156 See further Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, p.20 
157 Hourcade et al, 1996, Kram and Hill, 1996. 
158 See e.g. UNEP(1994), Kram and Hill (1996), Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, p.38, and Pan 2001 par.2.7 
159  E.g. Richels et al, 1996, Woerdman 2002. 
160 Westskog 2001, p.5 
161 Eykmans and Cornillie 2000. 
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Source:www.uio.no/studier/emner/annet/sum/SUM3000/v05/SUM-klimapol-okonomi-rettferd-180205.ppt 
 
The equal marginal costs point (B) will be a cost-effective equilibrium where the targets set 
through the international agreement are reached in the cheapest way possible.   
 
In general, the literature shows large potential gains from trade in emissions, both on 
regional and global basis162. These potential gains from trade are however calculated under 
the assumption of a well-functioning competitive market for quotas. In practice, the actual 
gains from trade might differ significantly from the potential gains.  
4.2.1 Factors reducing cost-effectiveness  
There are a number of factors that reduce the cost-saving potential of emissions trading.163 
Firstly, in a perfectly competitive market, cost-effectiveness is achieved through the 
minimization of total abatement costs across the participating countries. In reality, 
however, this might not be as straightforward as neo-classical economic theory suggest. 
Some large countries might take advantage of their market power through strategic 
                                                
162 See for instance, Westskog 2001, Pan 2001, Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, and Eykmans and Cornille 2000. 
163 Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, Westskog 2001, and Woerdman 2002 
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behaviour. If these large countries exercise market power, cost-effectiveness can be 
significantly reduced, and the general equilibrium of a perfectly competitive market will be 
distorted. Consequently, the equalisation of marginal abatement costs can no longer be 
guaranteed. 
 
Secondly, in an initial phase of a trading regime there might not be a well functioning 
market for quotas, and trade will be based on bilateral agreements that may involve high 
transaction costs.164 These transaction costs are a second factor that can reduce the cost-
effectiveness potential of the flexibility mechanisms.  
 
This section elaborates further on these factors and elucidates their meaning in the debate 
on the flexibility mechanisms. It is argued that, although these factors reduce the cost-
effectiveness of the flexibility mechanisms, they do not reduce the cost-effectiveness to 
such an extent that they completely refute the cost-effectiveness argument behind the 
flexibility mechanisms. Moreover, it is explained that the market power problem and 
transactions costs might also be present in the case of a restriction on the use of flexibility 
mechanisms, which in itself questions the importance of these cost-reducing factors.  
 
The supplementarity requirement, on the other hand, significantly reduces cost-
effectiveness and  will therefore be discussed first. 
 
4.2.1.1 The effect of the supplementarity requirement  
Most writers agree on the fact that the supplementarity requirement in the Kyoto Protocol 
adversely affects cost-effectiveness. Since the supplementarity reduces the possibility to 
acquire emission allowances and credits by way of emissions trading, joint implementation 
and the clean development mechanism, this reduces the cost-effectiveness of the 
mechanisms, because Kyoto parties are restricted in benefiting fully from the differences in 
                                                
164 Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, p.27, 40 
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marginal abatement costs between countries.165 With a limit on the quantity traded, the 
price for emission allowances will be higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gusbin, Klaassen, and Kouvaritakis 1999 
 
As the supplementarity requirement reduces cost-effectiveness, many economists argue for 
a flexible interpretation of the supplementarity requirement, which implies no ceiling on 
the possibility to rely on the use of the flexibility mechanisms to meet the Kyoto 
commitments. They underline in particular the increasing costs of complying with the 
Kyoto targets resulting from a stringent interpretation of the supplementarity requirement. 
For instance, Gusbin (1999) has presented the effect of a 50 per cent ceiling on the use of 
the flexibility mechanisms. In his study, the emission allowances an Annex I country can 
acquire from or transfer to another Annex I country are limited to half the volume traded 
without any restrictions on trading (i.e. in the full trade scenario across Annex I only). The 
first impact of the restriction on trade, that is in fact the objective of the constraint, is to 
increase the contribution of domestic action. Compared to the emission reduction efforts in 
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2010, acquisitions of allowances abroad would now be less important, and supplemental 
to domestic action in every region. Yet the conclusion drawn by Gusbin was that reducing 
the traded volume to half would increase annual costs for the Annex I Parties by 50 per 
cent.166   
 
Not only the supplementarity requirement does restrict the cost-effectiveness of the 
flexibility mechanisms. The market power problem and the issue of transaction costs might 
reduce cost-effectiveness as well, although these factors could be considered as 
unavoidable minor cost-effectiveness reducing factors. The reason that this section 
includes a discussion of these minor cost-reducing factors is to show that the cost-
effectiveness of the flexibility mechanisms is perhaps not so straightforward and should in 
fact be put in perspective. 
4.2.1.2  The Market Power problem 
To achieve a cost-effective distribution of abatement costs across countries, the market for 
tradable quotas must be competitive, which means that agents cannot, by their behaviour, 
influence the price of these quotas167. However, if there are certain large countries able to 
influence the price of quotas, cost-effectiveness in the quota market will be significantly 
reduced.168 In a study by Westskog (1996) it is shown that under specific conditions the 
market power exercised by certain agents in a tradable quota market could amount to a 10 
per cent efficiency loss compared to a competitive market169. 
 
In the case of emissions trading, Russia and Eastern Europe would be the most important 
seller of emission quotas under Annex I trading170. With trade limited to Annex I Parties, 
Russia could supply 70 per cent of the emission permits.171 This might lead to monopoly 
                                                
166 Gusbin et al 1999, using POLES, a partial equilibrium model of the world energy system 
167 Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, p.27 
168 Westskog 2001, p.10 
169 Westskog 1996 
170 Pan 2001, par.5.2.3 
171 Under the Kyoto Protocol, Countries should however maintain a 90 per cent commitment period reserve 
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behaviour and a limitation of the volume of permits supplied in an attempt to drive up their 
price172. Several authors173 have examined the effects of potential monopoly power by 
Russia and Eastern Europe and they identify that these countries could maximize their 
welfare and quota sales profit respectively. As monopolists, they could choose the price of 
emission quota supply to maximize profits, which will be the difference between the 
revenues from emission quota supply and the costs of domestic mitigation.174  
 
Market power may also exist within the other flexibility mechanisms. A host country could 
exercise market power by restricting its supply of JI/CDM projects. The following 
reasoning could underlie a host countrys supply restricting policy. Since developed 
countries take the lead in emission mitigation by the Kyoto Protocol, it is very likely that 
developing countries will have to commit emission limitation and reduction targets sooner 
or later. In order to avoid the possibility that only expensive opportunities are left after the 
Kyoto Protocol, developing countries may strategically limit the supply of cheap 
opportunities available to developed countries. For instance, some developing countries 
may reserve the first cheapest opportunity and only sell the second cheapest opportunity.175  
 
Although the cost-effectiveness of the flexibility mechanisms could be reduced due to 
some agents exercising market power, it is not a fundamental disadvantage. The main part 
of the cost-saving potential of the flexibility mechanisms is probably nevertheless going to 
be exploited.176 In the view of the cost saving potential of the Kyoto mechanisms, the 
market power problem does not affect this cost-effectiveness potential to a sufficiently 
serious degree, i.e. the cost-effectiveness argument of the flexibility mechanisms is not 
convincingly refuted by the market power problem.177 
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Indeed, market power is only a problem if there are some large sellers/buyers of quotas. 
Manne and Richels (1999) examine the sellers monopoly under the global trading and they 
find that if low-cost sellers are concentrated among a few countries, they may have 
considerable potential for extracting monopoly rents178. However, an increasing number of 
small countries participating in quota trade would reduce the problem of market power. 
With a view to a future climate change regime, with the possibility of a global trading 
regime, there are therefore fewer possibilities to exercise market power than in a regime 
with trade only between a limited number of countries.179 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that concerns about market power effects could also be raised 
under the supplementarity requirement. In a study by Ellerman and Wing (2000) it is 
demonstrated that implementing supplementarity, by imposing concrete ceilings on the 
purchase of emission quotas in a market for tradable emission quotas, gives rise to 
monopsonistic180 effects similar to those that characterize a buyers cartel. Restricting the 
purchase of emission quotas will result in a lower price for these quotas, following from 
demand restrictions181. In fact, all buyers will be better off over some range of restriction 
because up to a certain restriction the result will be lower total cost for importers than 
associated with free trade. In this situation, quota buyers could take advantage of their 
position and exercise market power.182 It is thus argued that the implementation of the 
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supplementarity requirement implies an exercise of monopsonistic power, since a concrete 
ceiling provides a coordinating mechanism for restricting demand that could be as effective 
as a buyers cartel or the exercise of market power by a significant importer.183 
 
Besides the fact that the market power problem might be present both under free trade and 
under the supplementarity requirement, several authors claim that the welfare loss due to 
the market power problem might be even bigger in the supplementarity case than in the 
monopoly case.  Bernstein et al  (1999) compared the monopoly power situation with a 
case of 30 per cent restriction on emission quota sales imposed by an international 
agreement. They concluded that the quota price will be higher under the 30 per cent 
restriction than under the monopoly case, and that this will harm OECD countries. The 
negative effect on Annex I Parties will spill over to non-Annex I Parties and cause their 
welfare to be lower under the 30 per cent restriction case than under the monopoly case.184 
At demand side, a restriction imposed on emission quota purchases also results in a terms 
of trade loss because less demands drive down the trading price and exports are reduced.185 
These authors conclude that even though market power reduces the cost-effectiveness of 
the flexibility mechanisms, a supplementarity cap of for instance 30 per cent could reduce 
cost-effectiveness even more.  
 
Also in a study by Eykmans and Cornillie (2001) an interesting link was noticed between 
the market power case and the trading ceilings. They interpret trading ceilings as a 
particular expression of market power. Import ceilings can be interpreted as a way of 
enforcing monopsony power on behalf of the emission quota buyers. Conversely, export 
ceilings limit the supply of emission quotas which makes them more scarce and drives up 
the market price. Export ceilings can therefore be interpreted as monopoly power exercised 
by the emission quota sellers.186 
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In sum, with no restrictions on the use of the flexibility mechanisms, a free trade 
equilibrium would be obtained in which the marginal costs of abatement would be 
equalized across sources, the global costs of compliance would be minimized and the gains 
from trade maximized. Although the market power problem may reduce the cost-
effectiveness of flexibility mechanisms, several authors convincingly explain that this 
market power problem is also present in the case of a ceiling on flexibility. Some authors 
are even convinced that a cap on flexibility reduces cost-effectiveness and welfare more 
than the presence of market power. So, although the market power problem reduces the 
cost-effectiveness of the flexibility mechanisms, it do not reduce the cost-effectiveness to 
such an extent that it significantly refutes the cost-effectiveness argument of the flexibility 
mechanisms.    
4.2.1.3 The problem of transaction costs 
Not only the market power problem, but also transaction costs could reduce the cost-
effectiveness of the flexibility mechanisms.187 There are mainly three sources for 
transaction costs in the implementation of the flexibility mechanisms188. Firstly, the costs 
of providing information about trading partners. Secondly, the expenses incurred in 
connection with trade negotiations; and thirdly, the authorities monitoring and 
enforcement costs.  
 
These transaction costs appear whenever buyers and sellers encounter in the marketplace to 
make transactions189. They will erode the efficiency of the flexibility mechanisms, because 
they insert an additional cost to permit prices.190 These higher prices of emission trading, 
for instance, raised by transaction costs will force the buyer to buy less and consequently 
the seller to sell less, and therefore reach a new equilibrium that is less efficient than the 
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one without transaction costs.191 Indeed, in contrast to the cost-effective solution with a 
tradable quota system with no transaction costs, marginal abatement costs are no longer 
equalized across agents. In the equilibrium with transaction costs, the agents set marginal 
abatement costs equal to the price of a quota plus the marginal transaction costs.192  
 
Although transaction costs might significantly affect the cost-effectiveness of the flexibility 
mechanisms, it is argued by Westskog (2001) that the extent of the transaction costs 
problem depends on the type of flexibility mechanism used193. There is, for instance, a 
difference between allowance-trading programs and credit-trading programs when it comes 
to the extent of the transaction cost problem. Credit based approaches like JI and CDM 
require advance approval of every single trade, whereas transfers in a permit trading system 
will be automatically registered and only have to be checked at the end of the year194. 
Consequently, an allowance-trading mechanism normally has very low transaction costs, 
whereas transaction costs following from credit trades are much higher.195 
 
Moreover, even though transaction costs may be significant in an initial phase of a trading 
regime, these costs will probably be of minor importance when the trading regime is well 
established.196 The transaction costs problem will probably be of less importance as the 
climate change regime evolves through time and experience. Comparable with the market 
power problem, transaction costs do therefore not reduce the cost-effectiveness of the 
flexibility mechanisms to such an extent that it significantly weakens the cost-effectiveness 
argument. Clearly, by using flexibility mechanisms, Annex I parties can meet their Kyoto 
reduction targets as cost-effectively as possible.  
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Several analysts have provided sound theoretical arguments and useful policy simulations 
indicating that mitigation costs can be greatly reduced if there are no restrictions on use of 
the flexibility mechanisms197. While the International Panel on Climate Change 
emphasized in its Fourth Assessment Report the importance of effective climate change 
mitigation, it is questionable whether there should in fact be any restriction on the use of 
Kyoto mechanisms. A stringent interpretation of the supplementarity requirement clearly 
reduces the cost-effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, so the question is, why argue for 
having ceilings on flexibility? The following paragraphs present the arguments in favour of 
the supplementarity requirement and the reasons for a ceiling on the use of the flexibility 
mechanisms. 
4.3   The Arguments in favour of the Supplementarity Requirement 
The cost-effectiveness of the flexibility mechanisms enables Kyoto Parties to meet their 
Kyoto commitments at the lowest possible costs. Although Article 3.3 of the Framework 
Convention underlines the importance of cost-effectiveness, it is questionable whether a 
future climate change regime should give priority to cost-effectiveness at the expense of 
other interests. Indeed, unrestricted use of the flexibility mechanisms might enable Parties 
to meet their current Kyoto targets. However, in the long term, this might not lead to a 
significant enough reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. Greenhouse gas 
emissions have to be drastically reduced on a global scale. To ensure the environmental 
effectiveness of the climate regime and the attainment of the ultimate goal of the 
Framework Convention and Kyoto Protocol, the unsustainable development trends in 
industrialized countries also need to be brought to a halt. This could be advanced through 
the supplementarity requirement. 
 
                                                
197 See e.g. Weyant 1999. Rose and Stevens (2001) however argue that restrictions on the volume of permit 
trading do not significantly reduce cost-savings if permit trading is confined to original Kyoto signatories. 
Although overall mitigation costs will increase if a tradable permit system is constrained, the result by Rose 
and Stevens indicate that this effect is rather negligible in the case of trading among Annex B countries. In a 
worldwide trading scheme the result will however be different. 
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Besides ensuring the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime, various other 
arguments underscore the importance of the supplementarity requirement. The following 
paragraphs present these arguments. Although most arguments could perhaps be partly 
refuted, the objective to enhance the equity level of the climate regime, which could result 
in developing countries participation in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, is the most 
ponderous argument and will be discussed last.   
4.3.1 The stimulation of Technological innovation  
It is widely understood that the Kyoto Protocols first commitment period targets represent 
only a first step, and indeed that the emission cuts during this period will be relatively 
inconsequential compared to the overall challenge of climate change. For environmentalists 
it is therefore not enough to meet the Kyoto targets: it must be done in a manner which 
enhances our ability to meet more stringent targets in the future. This means, critically, 
creating incentives for the development and dissemination of clean and efficient 
technologies. A crucial question is how a future climate agreement should be designed in 
order to encourage technological innovation within new renewable energy production. 
 
Several authors argue that use of the flexibility mechanisms could have a negative effect on 
technological innovation within energy efficiency and new renewable energy. Holtsmark 
and Hagem (1998), for instance, argue that emissions trading reduces marginal abatement 
costs, which again will reduce the demand for more energy efficient technologies. 
Emissions trading would thus reduce research and development incentives and 
technological innovation, and consequently adversely affect the long-term environmental 
impacts of the climate agreement.198  
 
The supplementarity requirement, on the other hand, could stimulate technological 
innovation within the industrialized countries. It is reasonable to believe that a climate 
agreement that commits the industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of 
greenhouse gases domestically, especially those leading economies considered to be at the 
                                                
198 Holtsmark and Hagem 1998, p.9, 31. 
 77
technology frontier, could have an important impact on technological development. If 
countries on the technology frontier are forced to limit their use of fossil fuels, it is likely 
that this will stimulate relevant research and development199, and as the industrialized 
countries are forced to implement some difficult measures at home, this might generate 
solutions that could then spread globally.200 As an illustration, replacing inefficient boilers 
in Ukraine with standard German boilers for instance, will give a considerable reduction in 
CO2 emissions, but it will not change the range of emission abatement technologies at our 
disposal. A similar level of emission reduction in Germany would require the invention of 
new boilers or other innovation in technology of techniques. This would in turn give all 
countries the potential to make deeper future emission cuts. 201  
 
The supplementarity requirement, by restricting use of the flexibility mechanisms and by 
increasing the costs of complying with the Kyoto Protocol, could thus foster technological 
innovation and the adoption of new, less emissions-intensive technology.202 The effect on 
emissions reductions in the long term through innovated technologies might turn out to be 
more important than the short-term emission reductions that will follow from the Kyoto 
Protocol.203 The intuitive importance of technology forcing has therefore remained an 
important factor for NGOs in favouring domestic action.   
 
Nonetheless, some authors question whether a ceiling on flexibility effectively encourages 
technological development at home. They argue, for instance, that emission trading does 
significantly reduce the costs of the climate protocol and this implies, other things being 
equal, that there are more resources available for research on technological development.204 
Moreover, Rose and Stevens  (2001) reason that, without a ceiling on flexibility, the 
country that purchases emission allowances always has an incentive to improve its 
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mitigation technology to reduce the number of permits it purchases, because that reduces 
the total costs for that country to comply with its Kyoto commitments.205  
 
The positive effect of the supplementarity requirement on technological innovation is also 
questioned by Buonanno (2000). This author argues that although a ceiling on flexibility 
enhances technological development, the overall effect on marginal abatement costs and 
economic growth appears to be detrimental. The cost reduction achieved through free 
emissions trading would seem to stimulate growth more than the increase of research and 
development and of technological innovation through restricted trading. Buonanno shows 
that ceilings on flexibility do not stimulate research and development expenditure globally. 
Although ceilings are likely to increase research and development efforts in OECD 
countries, which are mainly net buyers of allowances, ceilings are likely to reduce 
expenditures in Russia, China and developing countries, net sellers of allowances, where 
the greatest stimulus to carry out research and development comes from the possibility to 
trade emission permits without restrictions. Because when ceilings are introduced, the 
demand for permits is lower and their research and development effort is consequently 
reduced.206  
 
Frankly, Buonanno indirectly confirms the important effect of the supplementarity 
requirement, namely the stimulation of technological innovation within the industrialized 
countries. Even though a cap on flexibility might have a negative effect on abatement costs 
and economic growth, the effects of technological innovation in those leading economies, 
are of overriding importance to a future climate change regime. Technological innovation 
within new renewable energy production will, in the long term, enable the international 
community to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to a much larger extent.  
 
In sum, one of the arguments in favour of the supplementarity requirement is based on the 
view that the adoption of flexibility mechanisms reduces the incentives to carry out 
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environmental research and development and technological innovation, thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of the climate regime and increasing the costs of abatement options in the 
long run. Most important, without technological innovation Kyoto Parties may not be able 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a significant enough extent. In contrast, the 
incentives to technological innovation induced by the presence of ceilings on the use of 
flexibility mechanisms may enable the international community to tackle climate change 
more effectively. As an effect, this could reduce the impact of climate change control on 
the long run per capita income and welfare207. 
4.3.2 Role Model 
Besides the argument that technological innovation within the industrialized world might 
automatically spill over to developing countries, industrialized countries should also 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions at home in order to demonstrate willingness. A future 
climate regime requires worldwide participation and it is therefore important that 
developing countries are stimulated to adopt commitments themselves in the future. 
 
In fact, developing countries and countries with economies in transition aspire to having 
economies that resemble those that OECD countries enjoy today. It is unrealistic and 
unreasonable to assume that these countries will take on climate targets if industrialized 
countries decline to do so on the grounds of costs. Prioritizing domestic action therefore is 
a strong signal to developing countries and countries with economies in transition that low-
emissions pathways to prosperity are indeed possible and are being planned and developed. 
An unwillingness to promise emission cuts in rich countries, on the other hand, could be 
seen as confirming that such cuts were incompatible with running a rich country. 
Developing countries and EIT might then conclude that their economic aspirations preclude 
taking on climate commitments. Given that climate change by its nature requires emissions 
to be limited globally, this message could make the problem impossible to deal with 
effectively.208  
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Ironically, the global nature of the climate change problem was also used to argue against a 
restriction on the use of the flexibility mechanisms; since an emission cut has the same 
effect wherever it is made, why not make the cuts where they are cheapest? NGOs argued 
that this view ignored the political value of rich-country leadership, which means that all 
emission cuts are not in fact equal.209 Emission reductions within the industrialized 
countries have the political value of a role model and of setting an example for developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition. This argument is partly inspired 
through the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and the  fact that Annex 
I Countries should take the lead on climate change mitigation. This principle is further 
elaborated on in section 4.3.5.  
4.3.3 Compliance with Kyoto commitments 
A third argument in favour of the supplementarity requirement concerns compliance by 
industrialized countries with the current Kyoto commitments and especially with more 
stringent commitments in the future. Domestic action within industrialized countries is 
important because it gets more difficult for a Party to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a 
second commitment period if it has implemented its Kyoto commitments of the first 
commitment period mainly in other countries rather than initiating a trajectory of reducing 
emissions at home. The supplementarity requirement could therefore enable industrialized 
countries to undertake more stringent measures in the future. This is also in line with the 
Convergence objective mentioned in the Bonn Agreement.210 In order to narrow per capita 
emission differences between developed and developing countries, industrialized Parties 
have to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Although use of the flexibility mechanisms may reduce short term abatement costs and 
therefore prove attractive to governments preoccupied with their political survival, but 
precisely because they allow continued investment in energy-inefficient technologies, they 
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tend to foster solutions that prove more expensive in the long term. This may exacerbate 
the likelihood that such countries will find it politically impossible to comply in the 
future211. 
 
A different aspect connected to the compliance issue concerns the risk that completely 
unrestricted use of flexibility mechanisms could mean a less effective climate agreement 
due to low degrees of compliance.212  As an illustration, in the case of emissions trading 
between country A, the quota seller, and country B, the quota buyer, there could be 
potential economic gains for country A from non-compliance. Country A could for instance 
neglect its emission reduction commitments and sell emission quotas anyway213, which 
could mean no emission reductions at all, neither in country A nor in country B. In the case 
of unrestricted emissions trading, there is an increased risk of non-compliance especially by 
countries with high national abatement costs, because such a country could decide to be a 
seller of emission quotas without having the intention to compensate that by national 
abatement214.  
 
Some large sellers of quotas, such as Russia, are in a difficult economic situation. Selling 
quotas could then be an important source for foreign earnings. In the case of countries with 
large economic problems it might be too optimistic to expect that sale of quotas will be met 
by increased national abatement efforts. Hence, emission trading might enhance cheating 
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and lead to less global abatement, unless there is a mechanism which prevents countries 
from cheating215. In fact, the supplementarity requirement, by simply restricting the 
allowed use of emission trading, could also reduce the problem of cheating and enhance the 
effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.216  
4.3.4 The problem of hot air 
Connected to the previous argument behind the supplementarity requirement is the problem 
of hot air trading. In contrast to the problem of non-compliance, where countries decide 
to cheat and neglect their Kyoto commitments, there are also countries which are not under 
a reduction commitment at all. Indeed, the Kyoto protocol has provided some countries 
with emission limitations above their business as usual emissions. The positive difference 
between the emission limitation and the business as usual emissions is often referred to as 
hot air. At least Russia and some other EIT will have hot air. Emission trading entails 
that these countries can sell these excessive quotas. Increased emissions from the 
countries buying these quotas are however not compensated by reduced emissions from the 
countries that are selling their excessive quotas. The consequence is that total global 
emissions are higher than they would have been in a situation where the hot air quotas were 
non-tradeable. This is the problem of hot air trading.217 
 
The problem of hot air trading is mainly a political one. The practice of selling large 
quota surpluses to the industrialized countries, enabling them to avoid substantive action, 
could be regarded as violating the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol and the Framework 
Convention by violating the aim of developed-country leadership218. Batruch (1998) argues 
that unrestricted hot air trading between Annex I countries could set a legal precedent for 
developing countries. Once the negotiating process begins for developing countries, 
developing countries could rely upon the granting of hot air to countries with economies in 
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transitions as a precedent219. Indeed, if Annex I countries are allowed to trade hot air 
unrestrictedly, it could be difficult to negotiate a future agreement with new countries that 
would have no possibility for hot air trading.220  
 
The problems connected with the allocation of hot air quotas was one of the reasons that 
the EU, at the European Council of Ministers meeting in June 1997, concluded that 
flexibility mechanisms should be supplemental to domestic actions221. If use of the 
flexibility mechanisms is restricted, then hot air trading would also be restricted and the 
hot air problem would be limited. It is however questionable whether restrictions on 
emission trading or directly on hot air trading could reduce the problem of hot air. 
 
Grubb et al (1999)  and Schwarze (2001) argue that a supplementarity cap on the amount of 
quotas that Parties purchase would not necessarily solve the problem of hot air. It could 
simply mean that countries with real surplus assigned amounts would spread their hot air 
more widely among acquiring countries. Instead, in order to reduce the hot air problem, the 
only appropriate action would be a restriction on sales, which is however not covered by 
the supplementarity requirement.222 
 
It is not only questionable whether the supplementarity requirement would solve the 
problem of hot air trading, but also whether that effect is desirable. The countries that most 
likely have hot air probably also have the lowest abatement costs. Restricting hot air 
trading would therefore increase total costs of the Kyoto Protocol significantly. It is, in 
                                                
219 Batruch 1998 
220 Westskog 2001, p.13 
221 Ibid, and Schwarze and Levy, in: Schwarze 2001 
222  Grubb 1999, and Holtsmark and Maastad 2000.  
In fact, restricting the sales of hot air would also only have a temporary effect. With banking, assigned 
amounts that cannot be sold in the first commitment period will be saved for sale in future periods. A simple 
supply cap would thus only postpone the problem of hot air into the future. Therefore, a supply cap would 
not be a viable solution to the problem of hot air. See Schwarze 2001, p. 12. 
 84
other words, a trade-off between some hot air trading and increased costs of the protocol.223 
On the one hand, restricting hot air trading significantly increases the costs of the Kyoto 
Protocol. On the other hand, however, hot air trading between two countries is not 
environmentally effective as it does not result in a greenhouse gas reduction in either of 
these countries. 
 
With a view to the demands of a future climate regime, the possibility given to 
industrialized countries to buy emission allowances from other Kyoto parties and to 
increase their greenhouse gas emissions without a compensating reduction of emissions 
within the Parties selling these quotas, seriously weakens the strength of the climate 
regime. Indeed, hot air granted to countries could have serious implications on the 
achievement of the UNFCCC stabilization objective and might therefore slow down the 
process of combating climate change224. Hot air trading should therefore be restricted either 
directly through a hot air trading restriction or indirectly through the supplementarity 
requirement. 
4.3.5 Equity 
The most often mentioned argument in favour of the supplementarity requirement is based 
on the principle of equity. As mentioned in paragraph 2.2.3.1, it is often argued that 
unrestricted use of the flexibility mechanisms as an alternative to domestic action would 
contravene the equity principle and the idea of leadership by the industrialized countries, as 
use of the flexibility mechanisms would somehow enable the industrialized countries to 
transfer the burden of action onto other countries225. Proponents of the supplementarity 
requirement argue that it would yield a more equitable outcome if developed countries 
were restricted in exploiting developing countries natural resources.226 As equitable 
climate regime could work as a stimulus to get developing countries on board of a future 
climate regime, this argument should not be underestimated. 
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However, not all authors agree on the idea that the supplementarity requirement enhances 
equity. Rose and Stevens (2001) reason that the moral finger pointing characterization of 
buying ones way out of an obligation should be tempered by the fact that the permit 
buyer does incur some costs, trading does help promote efficient resource allocation, and 
the process is likely to transfer wealth from rich countries to poor countries.227 The transfer 
of technology and wealth is also mentioned by Buonanno et al (2000). This author argues 
that equity is not positively affected by ceilings on flexibility. Instead, Buonanno finds that 
use of the flexibility mechanisms increases equity and that the highest equity levels are 
achieved without ceilings, because use of flexibility mechanisms enables technology 
transfers and these tend to reduce income inequalities.228  
 
Yet the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention is not to transfer wealth or to 
reduce income inequalities, but instead to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system229. The equity principle as mentioned in the Framework Convention and the 
Kyoto Protocol concerns the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of 
these Kyoto Parties to the global effort regarding the Conventions objective.230 The equity 
principle therefore requires Annex I parties to undertake actions which reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and to contribute to stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere. By technology transfers and the reduction of income inequalities, although 
important, Annex I Parties do not directly contribute to the ultimate aim of the Framework 
Convention231.  
 
In addition, the de facto contribution of the flexibility mechanisms, in particular of the 
clean development mechanism, to technology transfers has been questioned. Although the 
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CDM is expected to lead to technology transfers from industrialized countries to 
developing countries, in practice, this is not so straightforward. The rate of technology 
transfer varies significantly across host countries. Factors are national import policies, 
technological development in given sectors, host country natural endowments and 
industrial outlook, together with national CDM policies. These all influence distribution of 
CDM projects across different sectors and the scope for technology transfer within a given 
sector.232 Haites (2006) concludes that overall only one-third of all CDM projects involve 
technology transfer. This is 30 per cent according to TERI (2006)233 and 25 per cent 
according  to Haake (2006). Thus, CDM projects do only in certain occasions entail 
technology transfers. 
 
Currently, it appears thus not to be convincing that technology transfers enhance the equity 
level of the climate regime. Instead, the supplementarity requirement works as a safeguard 
for the equitability of the climate change regime.  
4.4   In sum 
For the sustainability of the present and future climate change regime, it is important that 
that regime is environmentally effective, which requires significant global greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, that climate policy is based on cost-effectiveness, which allows the 
emission reductions to be achieved at the lowest possible costs, and that the regime is based 
on equity considerations, which would ensure developing countries participation. The 
flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol are included on the grounds of their cost-
efficiency. The supplementarity requirement, on the other hand, defends the equitability of 
the international climate regime, and although the requirement reduces cost-effectiveness to 
                                                
232 Also, some countries generally have much larger projects than the average, as in the case of China, which 
may also explain a higher share of technology transfer claims. India is the country hosting the highest number 
of CDM projects, however this country stands out with a strikingly low technology transfer rate. See Haake 
2006 
233 The Energy and Resources Institute 2006, The Clean Development mechanism and Technological 
change, 13 June  2006. 
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a certain extent, the equity level of the climate regime would be enhanced and thereby 
more global participation could be realised  
4.5       Cost-effectiveness versus Equity? 
The interpretation of the supplementarity requirement, either flexible or stringent, depends 
on which concept is given priority to. Cost-effectiveness interests require use of the 
flexibility mechanisms, a minimal restriction on their use and thus a very flexible 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement. Equity interests, on the other hand, 
require a restriction on the use of the flexibility mechanisms and thus a stringent 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement.  
 
Although priority could have been given to either of these concepts, and clarity on the 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement could have been provided, in fact, a 
successful environmentally effective climate regime is characterised by the representation 
of both principles. The principles are intertwined as they enhance each other, and the 
highest level of environmental effectiveness could be achieved through the integration of 
cost-effectiveness and equity. Such an integration of environmental, economic and social 
consideration is also mandated by the principle of sustainable development234. 
 
Already during the 1999 workshop of the European Forum on Integrated Environmental 
Assessment235, the link between equity and efficiency of climate agreements was 
underscored by all Parties. Increased equity would help increase the number of 
participating countries, thus enhancing the efficiency of the agreement236. Increased 
efficiency would reduce each countrys cost of controlling emissions, thus facilitating the 
adoption of transfer and co-operation policies that increase equity as well as the number of 
participating countries.237 This link was also supported by Workgroup III of the IPCCs 
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Fourth Assessment Report. This Workgroup suggests that successful agreements are 
environmentally effective, cost-effective, incorporate distributional considerations and 
equity, and are institutionally feasible238. To achieve the ultimate goal of the climate 
regime, equity and efficiency issues thus need to be carefully integrated.  
4.5.1 Interpretation of the Supplementarity Requirement in the light of the 
integrated equity-efficiency approach 
As an environmentally effective climate regime is both cost-effective and equitable, the 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement depends on the answer to the following 
question: to what extent is a restriction on cost- effectiveness sufficiently compensated by a 
positive effect on the equitability of the climate regime? This should be assessed for each 
flexibility mechanism separately because although supplementarity reduces cost-
effectiveness in general, its effect on the equitability of the climate regime will differ for 
each flexibility mechanism. Equity considerations are not as such directly affected by 
Annex I emissions trading and joint implementation as by the clean development 
mechanisms between Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties. Consequently, it would be 
reasonable to interpret the supplementarity requirement in the Articles 6 and 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol differently than the requirement in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Indeed, it could be argued that a restriction on the use of emission trading and joint 
implementation within Annex I Parties significantly reduces cost-effectiveness without that 
this is being sufficiently compensated by an increase of the level of equity of the climate 
regime. Developing countries interests are not sufficiently affected and therefore, a 
restriction on these two flexibility mechanisms seems to be ineffective. In this case, the 
supplementarity requirement should be interpreted flexibly, which means restricting use of 
these flexibility mechanisms to the least extent possible.  
 
In contrast, use of the clean development mechanism could adversely affect equity 
considerations and the idea of Annex I country leadership. As explained in paragraphs 
                                                
238 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report Workgroup  III, Par. 26 
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2.2.3.1 and 4.3.5, this could have a negative effect on the development of the future climate 
regime and the negotiations with developing countries on committing themselves to 
reduction targets. Even though a restriction on the clean development mechanism 
unavoidably reduces cost-effectiveness, this is sufficiently compensated by the 
maintenance of the equitability of the climate regime. Indeed, global participation attained 
through an equitable climate regime contributes to the environmental effectiveness of the 
regime. Therefore, use of the CDM should therefore be restricted through a stringent 
interpretation of the supplementarity requirement.  
 
On the other hand, however, it is also argued that the CDM assists Parties not included in 
Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective 
of the Convention239. The main idea is that the CDM will stimulate foreign direct 
investment in greenhouse gas reducing projects in developing countries, thereby providing 
financing opportunities to the investment in and adoption of low-emission energy 
technologies in these countries. Eventually, the CDM could cause a less carbon intensive 
development in non-Annex I countries.240 As the CDM should assist developing countries 
in achieving sustainable development, it is questionable whether a stringent interpretation 
of the supplementarity requirement is desirable. Indeed, even though equity concerns 
justify a stringent interpretation of the supplementarity requirement for the CDM, its 
potential to assist in achieving sustainable development might interrupt this reasoning.  
 
Yet several shortcomings of the clean development mechanism have been recognized, and 
its de facto contribution to sustainable development has been questioned. The first 
shortcoming concerns the current design of the CDM and, in particular, the additionality 
requirement which requires that emission reductions claimed from projects must be 
additional to what would have occurred in the absence of the CDM241. In order to meet this 
                                                
239 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12 
240 Haake 2006 
241 This requirement is also applicable to Joint Implementation projects, however for the purpose of this 
paragraph only the CDM will be discussed thoroughly. 
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requirement, project developers establish a baseline emissions scenario that reflects what 
would have occurred in the absence of the project. The amount of credits is then based 
primarily on the difference between the emissions baseline and the actual project 
emissions, as the CDM is supposed to reflect extra emission reductions.242 In practice, it 
has turned out to be very difficult for governments and investors to estimate the level of 
emissions that would have occurred in the absence of a project and then to calculate the 
marginal effect of their actions243. In this context, the CDM has been criticized because 
many projects might in practice not be significantly additional. This has at least two 
consequences. Firstly, use of the CDM could in fact lead to a rise in global emissions. 
Secondly, the CDM is unlikely to significantly alter emission trajectories in developing 
countries244. Frankly, as long as CDM projects do not have the potential to generate 
technological and behavioural changes , the current design of the CDM disables meeting 
the CDMs purpose. 
 
Related to the first shortcoming is the fact that the sustainable development component of 
the CDM is often surpassed by other interests245. As an illustration, a comprehensive 
assessment of the CDM in Latin America found that the sustainable development 
component of the CDM basically amounts to ensuring that the greenhouse gas mitigation 
project is congruent with the nations existing environmental policies, rather that actually 
precipitating policy changes in a manner that promotes cleaner development246. The CDM 
is based on market principles, where project proponents seek out the cheapest emission 
reductions, not the most robust developmental benefits. This is evidenced by the fact that a 
                                                
242 UNFCCC, 7th session, Marrakesh, Morroco, Oct 29- Nov 10 2001, Addendum to the report of the 
Conference of the Parties, 50-54, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/add.2. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf 
243 Baumert 2006, p.8 
244 Ibid. 
245 De Cendra de Larragán 2006. 
246 Figueres 2004 
 91
majority of credits are expected to come from projects generating low-cost reductions of 
non-CO2 gases, which are perceived to have little or no development benefits.247  
 
Finally, as explicated in paragraph 4.3.5, CDM projects only occasionally entail technology 
transfers. The shortcomings described above do weaken the CDMs potential to assist non-
Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention. Hence, on balance, the CDMs current potential to assist in 
achieving sustainable development does not interrupt our reasoning that equity concerns 
justify a stringent interpretation of the supplementarity requirement for the CDM. Although 
cost-effectiveness will be significantly reduced, once a global climate regime has been 
established and developing countries have been given the opportunity to exploit emission 
reduction opportunities within their own countries, the interpretation of the supplementarity 
requirement could be relaxed again. 
4.6    Conclusions 
This chapter assessed the supplementarity requirement for the flexibility mechanisms in the 
Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. At the outset, the rationality behind the 
flexibility mechanisms is explained. More specifically, it is argued that use of the flexibility 
mechanisms provide a cost-effective manner to meet the Kyoto Protocols emissions 
reduction target. The supplementarity requirement restricts use of the flexibility 
mechanisms and thereby this requirement adversely affects the cost-effectiveness of the 
climate regime.  
 
Nevertheless, although the requirement reduces cost-effectiveness, it might have a positive 
effect on various other aspects of the climate regime. Indeed, advantages of the 
supplementarity requirement and a restriction on the flexibility mechanisms are, for 
instance, that it would force industrialised countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
domestic actions and, hence, to develop new abatement technologies that could spread 
globally and really address the climate change problem in the long term. By increasing the 
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amount and intensity of domestic actions, it might be easier for Kyoto Parties to meet more 
stringent reduction targets in the future.  
 
In addition, industrialized countries undertaking reduction measures at home would have 
an important moral value vis-à-vis developing countries. As Annex I Parties need to respect 
the equity principle of the Framework Convention and the idea of Annex I Party leadership. 
This could in turn stimulate the willingness of developing countries to commit themselves 
to greenhouse gas reduction targets in the future. So, the development and design of the 
future climate regime would be positively affected. 
 
The principle of sustainable development requires demands an integration of the various 
interests and the highest level of environmental effectiveness would be attained by a future 
climate regime which is both cost-effective and equitable. The supplementarity requirement 
should be interpreted in a way most beneficial to these concepts.  
 
Total costs of emissions reductions do certainly increase as a consequence of trade 
restrictions, and restrictions on use of the flexibility mechanisms should be worth the 
efficiency loss. The interpretation of the supplementarity requirement should therefore 
depend on the answer to the question: to what extent is a restriction on cost-effectiveness 
sufficiently compensated by the positive effect on the equitability of the climate regime?  
 
From this point of view, I proposed a flexible interpretation for the requirement in the case 
of emissions trading (article 17) and joint implementation (article 6), and a stringent 
interpretation for the supplementarity requirement for the clean development mechanisms 
(article 12). As equity considerations are not directly affected by use of emissions trading 
and joint implementation within Annex I Parties, a stringent interpretation would go at the 
expense of the cost-effectiveness of the climate regime without that equitability would be 
significantly enhanced. Conversely, restricting use of the clean development mechanism 
could have an important moral value, and therefore a stringent interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement in Article 12 Kyoto Protocol seems appropriate. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This research paper examined the supplementarity requirement for use of the flexibility 
mechanisms in the articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Supplementarity refers to 
whether Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, while using the flexibility mechanisms, also 
undertake sufficient domestic actions to comply with the Kyoto reduction targets. As the 
supplementarity requirement has not been quantified in the Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto Parties 
have disagreed on the amount of actions needed to be taken at home.  
 
While some Parties rely on the idea of cost-effectiveness so as to ensure global benefits at 
the lowest possible costs, to justify almost unrestricted use of the flexibility mechanisms, 
other Parties point at the political, social, and ethical reasons for preferring domestic action 
and instead argue that the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, 
and sustainable development necessitate a ceiling on flexibility.  
 
This paper attempted to provide an interpretation of the supplementarity requirement based 
on the international law on treaty interpretation. Unfortunately, an interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement in accordance with Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties has not put forward an effective and usable 
interpretation. Although a literal, systematic, and teleological interpretation emphasizes the 
importance of domestic actions, the divergence between Parties on the amount of actions to 
be undertaken at home resulted in a vague interpretation of the supplementarity 
requirement in the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakesh Accords requiring that domestic 
actions shall constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Annex I Party 
meet its reduction commitments. 
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An analysis of Kyoto Parties state practice in accordance with Article 31.3.b of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties elucidated that currently most Parties implement the 
supplementarity requirement by complying with their Kyoto reduction commitments 
mainly through domestic actions. 1 Mt of greenhouse gas emissions reduced through use of 
the flexibility mechanisms is compensated by a reduction of more than 1 Mt CO2 
equivalents achieved through domestic action.  
 
It has to be recognized that this ratio might however change as soon as Parties become 
subject to more stringent reduction commitments. Indeed, the fact that Kyoto Parties 
achieve their Kyoto targets mainly through domestic actions might be due to a number of 
unintentional reasons instead of Parties express willingness to undertake most actions at 
home. Most importantly, while most Parties have attempted to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions since the early 1990s by various domestic measures, the flexibility mechanisms 
have been developed and have become gradually more operational since the last decade. As 
a consequence, in comparison with domestic mitigation measures, the use of the flexibility 
mechanisms is not yet as extensive. 
 
Besides an interpretation of the supplementarity requirement through the general rule of 
interpretation in accordance with Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, an 
assessment in accordance with the principle of effective interpretation needed to be part of 
this paper as well. The supplementarity requirement should be interpreted to ensure the 
attainment of the main objective of the climate regime as stated in Article 2 of the UN 
Framework Convention. To meet that objective, two essentials need to be recognized. 
Firstly, Parties have to become subject to much more stringent reduction commitments. 
Secondly, as greenhouse gas emissions are increasing significantly within the developing 
world, the next regime requires global participation. From this perspective, the arguments 
against and in favour of the supplementarity requirement were discussed.  
 
The two apparently conflicting arguments appeared to be cost-effectiveness and equity. 
However, it was argued that for an environmentally effective future climate regime, both 
cost-effectiveness and equity concerns are equally important and the interpretation of the 
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supplementarity requirement should therefore depend on its effect on both these concepts. 
Effectiveness interests require use of the flexibility mechanisms, a minimal restriction on 
their use and thus a very flexible interpretation of the supplementarity requirement. Equity 
concerns, on the other hand, require a restriction on the use of the flexibility mechanisms 
and thus a stringent interpretation of the supplementarity requirement. As both concepts are 
equally important, the interpretation should depend on the answer to the question: to what 
extent is a restriction on cost- effectiveness sufficiently compensated by a positive effect on 
the equitability of the climate regime?  
 
Assessing the supplementarity requirement form this perspective leads to a flexible 
interpretation of the requirement for international emissions trading and joint 
implementation between Annex I parties, because here the North-South relationship and 
equitability is not directly affected. A stringent interpretation would go at the expense of 
the cost-effectiveness of the climate regime without that this is sufficiently compensated by 
an increase in the equity level of the climate regime. 
 
Conversely, a significant restriction on the use of the clean development mechanism could 
have an important moral value, and could thus result in the increasing participation of 
developing countries in a future climate regime, which is an absolute necessity since 
developing countries greenhouse gas emissions are likely to overtake those of the 
industrialized countries within a few decades. Therefore, a stringent interpretation of the 
supplementarity requirement in Article 12 Kyoto Protocol seems appropriate. 
 
Some scholars have attempted to refute the necessity of a ceiling on the clean development 
mechanisms by arguing that this mechanism contributes to sustainable development 
through the transfer of technologies from industrialized to developing countries.  However, 
although unrestricted use of the this mechanism certainly allows a higher number of 
technology transfers, if that technology is not of such a high quality suitable to meet more 
stringent future reduction commitments, these transfers are rather ineffective. In contrast, 
the supplementarity requirement could stimulate technology innovation within 
industrialized countries which could then be spread globally.   
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In order to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, new technology 
should be innovated  and spread to developing countries. With these newer technologies, 
developing countries could develop their own industries, emit less greenhouse gases, 
contribute to tackling climate change, and they would be less vulnerable to the unavoidable 
consequences of climate change. For developing countries, this could lead to a higher 
standard of life which would not have become attainable that straightforwardly with 
transfers of relatively inefficient technologies.  
 
In sum, to ensure the environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness and equitability of the 
international climate regime and to ensure the attainability of the demands of the post-
Kyoto climate regime, Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol should be restricted in their 
use of the clean development mechanism, or in other words, they should reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions to the greatest extent at home. The implications of this conclusion vary from 
Party to Party and depends in particular on their national monetary state of affairs. 
Domestic actions should be preferred, however they should not place an unreasonable 
heavy financial burden on a Party. As to international emissions trading and joint 
implementation, there appears currently not to be a compelling need to restrict the use of 
these mechanisms by Annex I Parties.    
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